Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports
2006

A translator for automated code generation for service-based
systems
Sanjib (Sean) Banerjee
West Virginia University

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Banerjee, Sanjib (Sean), "A translator for automated code generation for service-based systems" (2006).
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 4214.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/4214

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses,
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU.
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu.

A TRANSLATOR FOR AUTOMATED CODE
GENERATION FOR SERVICE-BASED SYSTEMS

Sanjib (Sean) Banerjee

Thesis submitted to the
College of Engineering & Mineral Resources at
West Virginia University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Computer Science

Dr. Lan Guo
Dr. Supratik Mukhopadyay (Advisor/Committee Chair)
Dr. Frances Vanscoy

Lane Department of Computer Science
Morgantown, WV
2006

Keywords: Service Based Systems, Code Generation, Gentle, SOL, α-calculus

ABSTRACT
A Translator For Automated Code Generation For Service-Based
Systems
Sanjib (Sean) Banerjee
Service based systems are playing a major role in industry today, everything from the
verification of credit cards to booking airplane reservations are using some form of a
service based approach. This unfortunately brings up a really big problem, how do we
know that these services are actually doing what they are supposed to? Or, how do we
know the service based system doesn’t get somehow compromised when handling
sensitive information.
A collaborative project involving Arizona State University and West Virginia University
began in 2004 to first create a language, called α-calculus. We can prove that the code
written in α-calculus adheres to the requirements. The next step was to create a translator
that could convert code written in α-calculus to Secure Operations Language (SOL),
which could then be used to develop service-based systems.
While research has been done in this area, the α-calculus to SOL translator provides a
real world solution to creating provable/verifiable service based systems.
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INTRODUCTION
This work reported here was supported by the DoD/ONR under the Multidisciplinary
Research Program of the University Research Initiative under Contract No. N00014-041-0723. Not so long ago programs were written to perform, in today's terms, rather
simplistic tasks. Programs usually did a few very specific tasks, interacting with a few
hardware and software items. The dawn of the World Wide Web and interconnected
systems heralded a new age of computer programming. Programs now not only had to
interact with local hardware/software but also with hardware/software across a network.
Sometimes this network was spread across states and countries, making the problems of
security quite a nightmare.
Service based systems are playing a major role in industry today, everything from the
verification of credit cards to booking airplane reservations are using some form of a
service based approach. This unfortunately brings up a really big problem, how do we
know that these services are actually doing what they are supposed to? Or, how do we
know the service based system doesn’t get somehow compromised when handling
sensitive information. For instance, how do I know when I order that book from
Amazon.com and hit the send button my credit card information is not being leaked out
and being visible to everyone? Part of it is trust, we trust that the system Amazon.com or
anyone else for that matter is using is a reliable one. Even then there are stories of how
someone managed to gain access to private information. Surely we cannot base
everything on trust, especially when talking about something even more critical like
patient data at a hospital or a missile launch procedure. The question that arises is that is
there a way we can ensure that our services do exactly what we want them to do?
Ensuring that programs do what they are supposed to do has been difficult given the
nature of most programming languages. The languages we are generally used to, like C,
C++, Java lack any formal semantics or the semantics are not useful. Therefore, it
becomes very difficult to prove that your delivered product will actually do what you
intended it to do. For instance, Microsoft certainly doesn’t provide a certificate with their
Windows CD that says that the product will do exactly what you want it to do without
ever causing any unwanted reactions. Certainly the lack of such a certificate doesn’t
ward off potential clients, why because we assume that Microsoft has taken the time to
extensively test their product and we won’t encounter any problems that they haven’t
already found. This mentality doesn’t translate very well when we start talking about
systems like the stock exchange, patient monitoring systems, military systems, etc.
As an example let us look at a patient monitoring system, this system is being used to
treat patients with thrombosis. It is a service based system and consists of a patient
server, a central server, a nurse server, a dosage server and finally a doctor server. If a
patient is in critical condition it triggers a flag and sends a request to the central server.
The central server calls the doctor server stating that patient X is in critical condition.
The doctor server in turn calls the dosage server requesting the correct dosage to help the
patient. The value is returned from the dosage server back to the doctor server, the doctor
server in turn returns the value to the central server. The central server then calls the
nurse server which can then administer the dosage to help the patient.
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Thrombosis is a medical condition that causes a blood clot to form within a blood vessel,
thus obstructing the flow of blood within the circulatory system. Depending on the
location of the thrombus, a patient could die if the condition is not properly treated. One
of the medications used to treat thrombosis is Warfarin. Originally developed as rat
poison, it has now found its place in the treatment of medical conditions in humans.
Warfarin works by inhibiting the synthesis of blood clotting factors, in rodents this leads
to death by excessive bleeding but in the treatment of thrombosis this actually benefits
the patient. Drug monitoring is required because Warfarin has a very narrow therapeutic
index, this means the levels that are effective and the levels that cause excessive bleeding
are very close.

What if our patient monitoring system got compromised, instead of administering 5mg
the patient gets 50mg. The consequences of this could certainly be the death of the
patient; the domino effect could result in the hospital/doctor/etc getting sued for
malpractice, etc. Certainly in a case like this failure is not an option, redundancy and fail
safe methods are coded into the systems in case of a such a failure. But, that still doesn’t
guarantee that there won’t be any incidents. As we move towards the next century the
need for a more robust method of designing these mission critical service based systems
is needed. The ideal solution would be one where the systems being developed can be
proven to ensure their adhesion to the requirements.
Many papers have been written, and conferences have been held about creating some
basic rules to achieve provability. After all it is the proverbial silver bullet that will end
all problems. In the next section we take a look at one such paper written back in 1975,
long before the World Wide Web era that talked about the need to create provable
systems.
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We need provability
Since the dawn of the programming era, provability has been one of the most sought after
characteristics of a program. Provability refers to the validation of a program to meet
certain specifications. This is not to be mistaken with reliability, which refers to a
program's ability to conform to a certain expectations. In the 1970s Donald I. Good of
The University of Texas at Austin wrote a paper titled Provable Programming where he
delved into some of the ways a program could be made provable.
Good feels that there are five key principles to follow in order to write provable
programs. First is creating specific specifications, this almost seems redundant but in
order to prove a program we have to know exactly what it does. At the time
specifications were rarely well written, strangely a problem that still exists today. Poorly
written specifications cause code that may or may not meet the actual requirements of the
client. Hence, it is vital to gather all the information first before proceeding into the
coding phase. Next is the parallel development of program and proof, under this notion
the proof of the program should be one of the design goals. The third aspect is proof
factorization as Good calls it. This approach says that a program should not only be
provable as a whole, but also provable as independent units. This is quite interesting,
because it can almost be thought of as a pseudo proof by induction. You prove each
piece of the code before proving the whole thing. Next is provability before efficiency, a
program could do its task in 2 milliseconds but if we don't know for sure it actually does
the task then it’s rather useless. Lastly, the use of automated proof systems to help
reduce the amount of manual proving a developer has to do. Given the complexity of
most large scale programming projects, having to prove the whole thing by hand would
take too long and be prone to mistakes. Having automation tools will certainly ease the
problem, but care has to be taken to ensure the automation tools are correct in their
methodology.
The ideas that Good puts forward would certainly work if the languages being used by
the developers were provable. One could only do pseudo proofs that would show for n
iterations of a program it did what it was supposed to do. This naturally brings up the
question, what about the n+1 iteration would the program fail then? As programs became
increasingly complex and with the advent of the World Wide Web, along with that
service based systems and web services, the need to have provable programs became
increasingly more urgent.
A collaborative project involving Arizona State University and West Virginia University
began in 2004 to first create a language, called α-calculus. We can prove that the code
written in α-calculus adheres to the requirements. The next step was to create a translator
that could convert code written in α-calculus to Secure Operations Language (SOL),
which could then be used to develop service-based systems. The idea was to first write
code in α-calculus, prove it and then translate it to SOL and thus create a formal
programming model that could be used to develop service based systems.
In the next section we will take a brief look at some of the languages used to create
service systems, including the benefits and problems with each. Also, we will take a look
at some of the existing formal approaches for developing service based systems.
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Related work
The current industry standard for developing service based systems/web services is
BPEL/BPEL4WS (Business Process Execution Language for Web Services). A more
detailed discussion of BPEL is provided in the Preliminaries section. While BPEL is a
powerful tool for developing service based systems it lacks any formal semantics. It also
does not provide any automatic service composition and adaptation rules. BPEL is great
for modeling and creating workflows, its XML based schema is fairly simple to use. But,
the lack of formal semantics makes it a non provable language.
The other major language for creating services is OWL-S; it provides constructs for
unambiguously describing the properties and capabilities of web services. OWL-S
provides some limited formal guarantees, but again is not provable since there are no
equivalence theories. Also, like BPEL OWL-S fails to provide any automatic service
composition methods.
Some of the existing formal approaches for defining service based systems are rule based
modeling (SWORD). In SWORD a service is represented by a rule that says that given
certain inputs the service is able to produce a specific output. A rule based expert system
is then used to automatically check to see if a composite service can be created using a
set of existing services. Unfortunately, this method does not allow for services to have
side effects. Also, no known work has been found that uses SWORD to create situation
awareness or security policies.
Of course there are the classic process calculi like pi-calculus, ambient calculus, etc.
While these do provide ways for formal reasoning, they do not provide any methods to
process situation information and react to it. One could of course use linear logic, but it
is non decidable and only provides semi automated service composition methods.
The collaborative project between Arizona State University and West Virginia University
approach attempts to address these issues by providing a formal programming model for
service based systems. It is based on the classical process calculus model, but includes
operational semantics that involve interactions between: external actions –
communication, leaving and joining groups, internal computations – method calls of
named services. It can also model timeouts and failures in a monadic style and
implement access control using hierarchical groups.
In the next few sections we will gain a better understanding of what service based
systems/web services are. Following that, we will take a look at the languages α-calculus
and SOL, as well as SINS – a middleware for agents in service based systems. Finally, a
brief introduction to Gentle, the compiler construction tool used to create the α-calculus
to SOL compiler, will be provided.
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PRELEMINARIES
What are service-based systems?
Service-based systems are becoming more and more prevalent as a way to create large
scale distributed systems for applications ranging from mission critical to simple
commercial. In a service based world applications are developed by the combination and
coordination of different services. The individual services can reside in a single host
server or be spread across the World Wide Web on multiple different servers. When a
client makes a request for a specific task, a real time analysis is made of the task at hand
to find out which services can be combined to fulfill the client’s needs. Since it is
possible that the requests made by the clients can be totally obtuse from one another, it is
very important for the system to function in real time and be adaptive in nature.
Just like countries and states have governing bodies, service based systems too have their
governing body called the Service Level Agreements (or SLAs). These also specify a
certain Quality of Service (QoS) level that the service providers have to meet. There are
essentially seven requirements in a given QoS agreement – availability, accessibility,
integrity, performance, reliability, regulatory and security.
• Availability refers to the quality aspect of whether or not service is present or ready for
immediate use. The score is given as a probability, a higher value means the service is
always ready while a smaller value means the service may or may not be available. Also,
a time-to-repair (TTR) value is assigned; this refers to how long it would take the service
to get repaired if it failed. Naturally a smaller value is more desirable.
• Accessibility refers to the quality aspect of the service that deals with the degree to
which it is capable of handling a service request. It can be measured as a probability
ratio. A service can be available but not accessible; a high degree of accessibility can be
achieved by using scalable systems.
• Integrity refers to the quality aspect of how well the service maintains the correctness of
the interaction with respect to the source. Proper execution of a service transaction will
provide this correctness of interaction. If a transaction does not complete then the
changes that were made in the course of the transaction are rolled back.
• Performance refers to the quality aspect that measures how well a service is working. It
is measured in terms of throughput and latency. Throughput is the number of service
requests handled in a given period of time, and latency is the time between when a
service request is made and a response is received.
• Reliability refers to the quality aspect of services that measures the ability of being able
to maintain the service and its quality. The number of failures per day/month/year could
be a measure of reliability. We could also think of reliability as the measure of whether a
service requested matches the service provided.
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• Regulatory refers to the quality aspect of services that measures its ability to comply
with the rules, laws, standards, etc of the service level agreement. Adherence to
standards is necessary in providing a good quality of service.
• Security refers to the quality aspect of services that measures its ability to provide
confidentiality and non repudiation by authenticating the parties involved. Security is
vitally important as a lot of these services interact over the Internet which is a very public
domain.
Again, like any nation state the SLAs provide a penalty framework for dealing with
infractions to the QoS agreement. Since service based systems span networks it is
important to have these penalties to ensure that there are no security breaches, or failure
to provide a service in a timely manner, etc. It is often very difficult for service providers
to live up to the QoS because the network is always open to attacks.
Service-based systems are being increasingly used in mission critical applications such as
the military, hospital, aviation, e-commerce, etc. Given the sensitivity of these
applications the QoS needs to include adaptability, situation awareness and security.
Adaptability refers to the system’s ability to react to an external action while still
providing the service; situation awareness refers to the ability to detect changes in the
environment and adapt as needed. If a failure should occur the system should
automatically find a service that can provide the same functionalities to the user and
deploy it in place of the failed service.
A very simple service based system example could be an intrusion detection system. In
this example we will have a Monitoring Agent, a Commander, several Ships and an
Enemy. The Monitoring Agent detects an Enemy in a controlled zone, it sends out a
signal to the Commander saying “Enemy Detected.” The Commander in turn sends out a
signal to the nearest ship, say Ship A, asking it to “Destroy Enemy”. Ship A then
executes the command, using the information provided. Naturally this is a rather
simplistic example; we could enable some failsafe methods into it. Say Ship A does not
respond in 10 seconds, the Commander can then call up Ship B with the same request and
Ship B can neutralize the Enemy. We could even take it a step further and make it
adaptive, the Commander could select Ships based on who is closet to the Enemy.
If we were to develop this system there would naturally be some security policies we
would want to enforce. For instance, we only want the Commander to communicate with
the Ships. The Monitoring Agent should not get direct access to the Ships, the reason
being the Monitoring Agent could easily be compromised. Also, response time has to be
critical since this is real time based. If Ship A doesn’t respond there needs to be
contingency plans to contact Ship B, Ship C, etc. Since the Enemy is moving there needs
to be real time adaptability; if Ship A fails to respond then we can’t use the same coordinates when asking Ship B to neutralize the Enemy because they may or may not be
correct.
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What are web services?
Web services are simple, self contained, modular, distributed and dynamic applications
that can be used to perform a variety of functions. Web services allow machine-machine
interaction as opposed to human-machine interactions. Web services are simply a
specific type of service based systems, and hence are governed by the same Service Level
Agreements and Quality of Service rules. An example of a web service would be
orchestrating a pizza lunch at an office. First we would need to contact a secretary to
obtain a free room, and then we would need to contact a pizza vendor and provide them
with the room number and order request. A web service for this would automate
everything: first by contacting the secretary's computer and obtaining a free room and
booking it, then contacting the pizza vendor's computer and providing them with the
room information and order information.
The concept of the World Wide Web is slowly changing from one of human interaction
to one of machine interaction. In the forefront of this machine interaction movement are
web services; they are being used more frequently now as we move towards the second
generation of the World Wide Web. Web services are being deployed in mission critical
applications like stock exchanges, hospital and health care, military, etc. Failure in these
environments could have catastrophic consequences.
Web services have become increasingly popular in the recent years; the following are
some major companies that provide a web service based infrastructure.
•

Amazon.com - Search Products, Product Information, Cart System, Wish List

•

eBay - Auction Search, Bidding, Auction Creation

•

FedEx - Tracking

•

Google - Web Search, Maps

•

Mappoint - Maps

•

MSN - Virtual Earth

•

PayPal - Payment System

•

Xignite - Financial market data

•

Yahoo! - Maps, Traffic

In the next section we will look at a language called BPEL that is commonly used to
develop web services. Despite being relatively new it has become an industry standard
for developing web services.
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What is BPEL
BPEL4WS (BPEL in short) – Business Process Execution Language for Web Services is
one such language created for web services. BPEL4WS as formally defined by IBM is:
“Business Process Execution Language for Web Services provides a means to formally
specify business processes and interaction protocols. BPEL4WS provides a language for
the formal specification of business processes and business interaction protocols. By
doing so, it extends the Web Services interaction model and enables it to support business
transactions. BPEL4WS defines an interoperable integration model that should facilitate
the expansion of automated process integration in both the intra-corporate and the
business-to-business spaces.”
BPEL was designed to be what is called a large programming language, as opposed to a
small programming language like C or C++. A few companies had large programming
languages; like Microsoft had WSFL and IBM had XLANG. BPEL was developed by
combining WSFL and XLANG into one language and in 2003 BEA System, IBM,
Microsoft, SAP and Siebel Systems submitted BPEL 1.1 to OASIS for standardization.
The developers of BPEL came up with ten design goals. The follow list was taken from
the Wikipedia page on BPEL.
•

Goal 1: Define business processes that interact with external entities through Web
Service operations defined using WSDL 1.1, and that manifest themselves as Web
services defined using WSDL 1.1. The interactions are “abstract” in the sense that
the dependence is on portType definitions, not on port definitions.

•

Goal 2: Define business processes using an XML based language. Do not define a
graphical representation of processes or provide any particular design
methodology for processes.

•

Goal 3: Define a set of Web service orchestration concepts that are meant to be
used by both the external (abstract) and internal (executable) views of a business
process. Such a business process defines the behavior of a single autonomous
entity, typically operating in interaction with other similar peer entities. It is
recognized that each usage pattern (i.e. abstract view and executable view) will
require a few specialized extensions, but these extensions are to be kept to a
minimum and tested against requirements such as import/export and conformance
checking that link the two usage patterns.

•

Goal 4: Provide both hierarchical and graph-like control regimes, and allow their
use to be blended as seamlessly as possible. This should reduce the fragmentation
of the process modeling space.

•

Goal 5: Provide data manipulation functions for the simple manipulation of data
needed to define process data and control flow.

•

Goal 6: Support an identification mechanism for process instances that allows the
definition of instance identifiers at the application message level. Instance
identifiers should be defined by partners and may change.
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•

Goal 7: Support the implicit creation and termination of process instances as the
basic lifecycle mechanism. Advanced lifecycle operations such as "suspend" and
"resume" may be added in future releases for enhanced lifecycle management.

•

Goal 8: Define a long-running transaction model that is based on proven
techniques like compensation actions and scoping to support failure recovery for
parts of long-running business processes.

•

Goal 9: Use Web Services as the model for process decomposition and assembly.

•

Goal 10: Build on Web services standards (approved and proposed) as much as
possible in a composable and modular manner.

BPEL not only provides the ability to send and receive messages it also supports the
following as described on the Wikipedia site for BPEL.
•

A property-based message correlation mechanism

•

XML and WSDL typed variables

•

An extensible language plug-in model to allow writing expressions and queries in
multiple languages: BPEL supports Xpath 1.0 by default

•

Structured-programming constructs including if-then-elseif-else, while, sequence
(to enable executing commands in order) and flow (to enable executing
commands in parallel)

•

A scoping system to allow the encapsulation of logic with local variables, faulthandlers, compensation-handlers and event-handlers

•

Serialized scopes to control concurrent access to variables

As powerful as BPEL is in orchestrating web services, it lacks a formal semantics and
cannot be verified. This leads to huge problems, how does a developer know their code
actually does what it’s supposed to? For instance, even the simplest Hello World
program may not actually provide the correct output and instead may cause the system to
crash and give undesired results. At first glance the problem seems unsolvable since
BPEL is neither provable nor verifiable. But, what if there existed a language that was
provable and another that was verifiable. One could easily design a translator to go from
one to the other. Assuming, that the translator in itself is provable/verifiable we suddenly
have one approach for creating provable/verifiable BPEL code.
In the next section we will look at one such novel language called α-calculus, a process
calculus, which can be proven using mathematical induction. Following that we will
look at SOL (Secure Operations Language), a verifiable synchronous language for
developing reactive systems. Both of these languages in conjunction with their
translators can enable us to create BPEL code that has already been proven and verified.
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What is α-calculus?
α-calculus is a language developed in-house for the purpose of creating a formal
approach for defining service based systems. A system defined in α-calculus can be a
recursive process, or a system lying in a node enclosed in a firewall or the parallel
combination of two systems. A node is defined as the space enclosed by the firewall with
a name, and the name can be considered as the password used to access the node. A
recursive process can be of several different types: it can be a name restriction, the
inactive base process, parallel combination of two processes, an identifier for a process, a
process executing an internal action, a process executing an internal computation, a time
out process, a failed process or a service that exports methods.
We will now look at the syntax and grammar of α-calculus:
(System)
S::=
fix I=P
N[S]
S||S

(recursion)
(named domain)
(par. systems)

x
n

(variable)
(name)

N ::=

(Process)
P::=
(new n) P
(name restriction)
0
(inactive process)
P||P
(par. composition)
I
(identifier)
E.P
(external action)
C.P
(int. computation)
P1+P2
(nondet. choice)
fail(I)
(failure)
catch(I).P
(failure handler)
time t.P
(timeout)
P{l1(x1),…;…ln(xn)}(method export)
(External Actions)
E ::=
M
K

(Domain)
(Comm.)

Ch(x)

(input)

K::=
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Ch<Str>
(output)
mc(C1,…,Cn)<Str> (multicast)
Ch::= N

(Channel)

M ::=
in N
out N
open N
ε

(enter a dom.)
(exit a dom.)
(open firewall)
(no action)

(Internal Computations)
C::=
let x=D instantiate C
if ρ then P else P’
replace(I:li)
li ← lj
ρ
ε
tt
ff
┴

(let reduction)
(conditional)
(method replacement)
(method modification)
(constraint evaluation)
(no-computation)
(constant true)
(constant false)
(failed computation)

I:li(y)

(method invocation for identified service)

D::=

I:li=
prei::posti[y]
pre::= σ[y] ∧ ρ[y]
post::= (σ[x] ∧ ρ[x]) x
(Types)
σ::=
b
σ→σ

(base type)
(function type)

(Linear arithmetic constraints)
x,y
c

(variable)
(natural number)

ρ::=

(constraint)
x>c
x<c
12

x>=c
x=<c
x==c
x>y
x<y
x=<y
x>=y
x==y
x >=y+c
x>y+c
x =< y+c
x<y+c
x==y+c
ρ&&ρ
Back in the Preliminaries section we talked about service based system and described an
intrusion detection system as an example, now we will look at how we can define the
same system using α-calculus. Our agents are the Monitoring Agent, the Commander
and the Ships.
Monitoring Agent:
fix MA= let z=MA:detect_intrusion() instantiate if z=true then let <x,y>=MA:
get_enemy_coordinates() instantiate ch<x,y>.MA else MA
Commander:
fix CMD=ch(x,y). ch1<x,y>.<destroy>.CMD
Ships:
fix shipA= ch1(x,y).ch2(d). if d=“destroy” then let t= (shipA:lock_radar(x,y) instantiate
let s=instantiate shipA:load_missile().(let z=shipA:fire(x,y) instantiate if z=
enemy_destroyed then <z> ) then shipA) else shipA
What makes α-calculus novel is that we can easily prove the above system and ensure
that the Ship eventually executes the destroy command. In order to do this proof we first
need to have some basic assumptions:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Every service will eventually return
If an enemy is detected detect_intrusion will return a value
get_enemy_coordinates will return a value once detec_enemy returns a value
lock_radar will return a value once get_enemy_coordinates has passed the values
to it
load_missile will return true once lock_radar has been evaluated
enemy_destroyed will return a value

Each of the 5 functions will have some pre and post conditions as follows:
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detect_intrusion
pre condition – true
post condition – true or false
get_enemy_coordinates
pre conditions – true
post conditions – x: x-coordinate, y: y-coordinate
lock_radar
pre conditions – x: x-coordinate, y: y-coordinate
post conditions – true
load_missile
pre condition – x: x-coordinate, y: y-coordinate
post condition – true
enemy_destroyed
pre condition – x: x-coordinate, y: y-coordinate
post condition – enemy destroyed or enemy not destroyed
Now, we can take a look at the operational semantics of the language before going into
the actual proof. We will use six simple rules to derive the proof system, they are as
follows:
ch<t>.P || ch(x).Q, x:T1
---------------------------P || Q [t/x], t: T1

(1)

I:li → pre:post, yi |= pre
----------------------------I:li → post

(2)

ρ → true
----------------------------if ρ then P else P’→P

(3)

ρ → false
----------------------------if ρ then P else P’→P’

(4)
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A→B
------------------A.B → B.P

(5)

X→t
----------------------------------let z=X instantiate P → P[t/x]

(6)

Now, if an enemy is detected then the post condition of detect_intrustion will be true.
This will result in get_enemy_coordinates settings its post condition to the coordinates of
the enemy. After that the system will instantiate ch<x,y> which contains the enemy
coordinates and pass it to the commander. The commander in turn will pass the
command to destroy to the ships. The ships will first lock_radar on the enemy using the
coordinates from the commander and then will load_missile with the same coordinates
before invoking the fire command that will destroy the enemy. Thus we can see from the
command detect_intrusion we eventually reach the command enemy_destroyed, thereby
proving that the system actually does what it is supposed to do.
In the following section we will begin looking at Secure Operations Language (SOL)
which is one of the many languages available for developing service based systems. One
of the great aspects of SOL is that it is verifiable thus providing the developer with the
satisfaction of knowing they can actually verify the code written is adhering to its
requirements.
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What is Secure Operations Language (SOL)?
SOL is a synchronous programming language, developed at the Naval Research Labs,
which can be used to develop reactive systems. The language finds its place in
application development in mission critical cases like the navy, military, medical
industry, etc. The need for a language like SOL arose with the desire to create high
assurance systems; that is a system that provides security, safety, timeliness, survivability
and fault tolerance. One key aspect of SOL that sets it aside from other more
contemporary languages is that it is a secure language, which means it is open to
automatic theorem proving or model checking.
SOL is an event driven language with system behavior modeled as modules. Each
module may be either deterministic, reactive or both. Each module also contains state
variables falling into the following categories: monitored, controlled or internal. As the
names suggest; monitored are environment variables that are watched by the module,
controlled are those variables that the module controls and internal variables are updated
by the module but not visible to the environment. Each controlled and internal variable
of the module has one definition that will determine when and how the variable gets
updated. The assumptions section includes any assumptions about the environment the
user is making; it is up to the user to ensure there are no logical contradictions. The
guarantees section contains what the invariants are. The definitions section is the core
part of a SOL module and contains variable interactions just like in any other
programming language.
The basic code structure in SOL is as follows:
module module_name {
type definitions
…
monitored variables
…
controlled variables
…
internal variables
…
assumptions
…
guarantees
…
definitions
…
} // end module_name
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The figure below, from SOL: A Verifiable Synchronous Language for Reactive Systems
by Dr. Ramesh Bharadwaj, shows the available syntax for SOL definitions.

Verification of SOL can be performed by a tool called SALSA – an invariant checker for
reactive synchronous systems. If an invariant is not provable, SALSA will return a
counter example that the user must verify to ensure it is actually reachable. SALSA not
only provides invariant checking but also consistency checking. The latter is very helpful
as it returns errors if there missing cases in a modules or undesirable non determinism
instances.
While SOL allows a developer to create agents for reactive systems, a middleware is
needed to ensure there is a certain degree of trust between the mobile agents and also
ensuring that they comply with certain security policies. In the next section we will
discuss one such middleware called SINS (Secure Infrastructure for Networked Systems).

17

What is Secure Infrastructure for Networked Systems (SINS)?
How does one develop a trusted application that resides in a distributed network like the
Internet? The Internet is open and prone to attacks ranging from Trojans, viruses, to
distributed denial of service attacks. SINS, developed at the Naval Research Labs, is one
way to ensure mobile agents have the required degree of trust. SINS is a middleware for
secure agents and not only provides the required degree of trust for the mobile agents, but
also ensures they are compliant with a set of enforceable security policies.
As outlined in the paper SINS: A Middleware for Autonomous Agents and Secure Code
Mobility by Dr. Ramesh Bharadwaj, SINS addresses the following requirements of
secure mobile agents:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The author and initiator of an agent must be authenticated.
The integrity of an agent's code must be checked.
Interpreters must ensure that agent privacy is maintained during data exchange.
Interpreters must protect themselves against malicious agents.
Interpreters must ensure that migrating agents are in a safe state.
Agents must protect themselves from malicious hosts and interpreters.
An initiator must be able to control an agent's flexibility; i.e., restrict or increase
an agent's authorization in specific situations.
Initiators must be able to control which interpreters are allowed to execute their
agents.

As discussed in the previous sections the mobile agents are created using SOL. As
explained before, an application written in SOL is comprised of a set of modules. To
ensure the ease of application creation the code is created using Visual SOL, much like
Visual C or Visual BASIC this ensures a faster and easier application development. Each
of these modules is run on what is called an Agent Interpreter. The Agent Interpreter
then executes the modules based on a certain set of security policies that have been
defined locally. SOL applications are not limited to a single Agent Interpreter; they
could run on multiple Agent Interpreters spread over a vast network. This makes the
problem of enforcing the local policies; the application could be within the guidelines of
one policy while beyond the scope of another. Thus, care has to be taken when writing
the applications to ensure they follow each local security policy.
There are a few basic assumptions about what SINS can and can’t do, they are as follows:
•
•

•
•

Each agent interpreter will be run to completion by the hosts.
Each agent will be run correctly by the agent interpreters; naturally if the
interpreter doesn’t run them correctly we can’t say for certain whether or not they
are following the security policies, etc.
Each agent interpreter will transfer agent data as requested; again we hope the
interpreter doesn’t randomly transfer data when it wasn’t asked to.
The agent code and data will not be kept private from the host that is running the
application.
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•

•

Intercommunication between agents will not be kept private from hosts. We
don’t want malicious agents to compromise the host that is running the
application.
Agent cannot carry any secret keys; given that the host could be compromised we
don’t want any secret keys to be leaked out.

SINS also attempts to address the following security issues faced by mobile agents.
•

•

•

•

•

•

Authentication and authorization – in order to prevent the agent code from
getting tampered by malicious hosts, or hosts that have somehow become
compromised the SOL code is digitally signed and stored in a code repository.
When handling a mobile agent each host will retrieve the code either from the
repository or from another host that has the most recent copy. SINS also
provides role based access control and management (RBAC) and trust
management (TM) utilities to help authenticate the agent initiator, and to provide
access to host resources.
Integrity of agent code – since the agents are programmed in SOL, a verifiable
language, one can gain a certain degree of trust knowing that the programs will
have no unbounded loops, no buffer overflows, etc. Other languages like Java,
C, C++ are non verifiable, hence a client has to trust that the developer hasn’t
inadvertently caused any problems. SINS proves each agent is in compliance
with the local security policies by using its compliance checker.
Agent privacy – agent activities are monitored by SINS using its own security
architecture. Also, Agent Interpreters intercommunicate using SSL to prevent
eavesdroppers from gaining access to private information.
Protection from malicious agents – malicious agents could not only
compromise the host that is running them, but also other agents and applications.
In order to protect the host from malicious agents the compliance checker can
detect any malicious activity.
Safe agent migration – a migrating agent could easily become malicious and in
order to prevent this from happening, each agent has what is called a state
appraisal function. The state appraisal function simply checks to make sure that
the agent will perform as required and the data hasn’t been tampered with. The
compliance checker can also be used to ensure the appraisal function does what it
is supposed to do and meets certain safety requirements.
Agent protection from malicious hosts – while one has to protect the host from
malicious agents, the converse also has to be done in order to prevent the host
from obtaining classified data from the agents. Currently there is no real
framework to help protect agents from hosts, but a sort of protection force is set
up using security agents. These, much like their human counterparts, ensure that
the individual agents don’t partake in any malicious activities.

In the next section we will take a brief look at Gentle, the compiler construction tool used
to develop the α-calculus to SOL compiler before moving onto an in depth look at the
actual compiler.
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An introduction to Gentle
Compiler construction in the past has been arduous because of the lack of a good
compiler construction tool. Programming even the simplest of compilers using a lowlevel language like C has been time consuming and often error prone. Today compiler
construction, although not any simpler, is made easier with the availability of tools like
Gentle, Antlr, etc. Gentle allows for a very high level definition of a compiler and avoids
some of the pitfalls of more standard compiler construction practices.
A simple example of a calculator that takes a set of arithmetic functions and prints them
when written in Gentle would look something like this.
'root' expression(-> X) print(X)
'nonterm' expression(-> INT)
'rule' expression(-> X): expr2(-> X)
'rule' expression(-> X+Y): expression(-> X) "+" expr2(-> Y)
'rule' expression(-> X-Y): expression(-> X) "-" expr2(-> Y)
'nonterm' expr2(-> INT)
'rule' expr2(-> X): expr3(-> X)
'rule' expr2(-> X*Y): expr2(-> X) "*" expr3(-> Y)
'rule' expr2(-> X/Y): expr2(-> X) "/" expr3(-> Y)
'nonterm' expr3(-> INT)
'rule' expr3(-> X): Number(-> X)
'rule' expr3(-> - X): "-" expr3(-> X)
'rule' expr3(-> + X): "+" expr3(-> X)
'rule' expr3(-> X): "(" expression(-> X) ")"
'token' Number(-> INT)
'root' expression(-> X)
code(X)
'action' code (Expr)
'rule' code(plus(X1, X2)):
code(X1) code(X2) print("plus")
'rule' code(minus(X1, X2)):
code(X1) code(X2) print("minus")
'rule' code(mult(X1, X2)):
code(X1) code(X2) print("mult")
'rule' code(div(X1, X2)):
code(X1) code(X2) print("div")
'rule' code(neg(X)):
code(X) print("neg")
'rule' code(num(N)):
print(N)
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α-CALCULUS TO SOL TRANSLATOR
Background
In developing a formal approach for developing service based systems, my contribution
was developing the α-calculus - SOL translator. The translator is a key element in
developing the formal approach, one first writes code in α-calculus and then proves that
the code actually holds true with the given requirements. After this the code is passed
through the translator and the resultant SOL code can be verified to once more ensure
that it is in compliance with our requirements before being deployed. Of course one
basic assumption is that the translator in itself in provable; while this task hasn’t been
completed yet it can be done fairly easily.
Having worked on the initial development of the SOL – BPEL (a discussion of the SOL –
BPEL translator will come later) I realized that writing the translator in C would not be a
good idea. I needed a compiler/translator construction tool that was fairly easy to use and
the learning curve wasn’t very steep. I came up with two options – Gentle or Antlr. Both
of these have been heavily used in industry with a great deal of success. I ended up
choosing Gentle because its syntax was very similar to Prolog, a language that I had
worked with before. A few weeks of writing simple code in Gentle and reading the
manual and I had a rudimentary understanding of how to use it to create the translator.
Given the complexity of the translator a good testing mechanism was needed, past
projects were simple enough that I could write the whole code and then perform the
required tests. Doing that for the α-calculus – SOL translator would be disastrous, hence
a modular design structure was chosen. First and foremost I needed to have test cases,
ranging from the very basic to the complex. Each test case then had to be translated by
hand and verified to ensure I had a model to check the machine generated translation.
The translator was built in parts, starting of with simple “Put” statements for some of
basic SOL elements like “monitored variable”, “controlled variables”, etc. As layers of
complexity were added to include conditionals, loops, etc they were tested to ensure
nothing prior had been affected. This ensured the debugging process did not get too out
of hand.
In order for the translator to work correctly, it has to first parse the α-calculus code and
ensure it is correct. Then it will use the tokens that are created in the parsing phase to
translate the code into SOL. It is critical to get the parsing done correctly, as without the
proper tokens the translated SOL code will not be correct. The next section will provide
a directory structure, installation instructions and a short guide on how to use the
translator.
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A short guide to using the translator
This software is designed to run in any version of Unix/Linux. The Gentle Compiler
Construction Tool is needed in order for this compiler to work. The Gentle Compiler
Construction Tool can be downloaded at http://gentle.compilertools.net/ or by following
the direct link: http://gentle.compilertools.net/gentle-97.tar.gz. Installation of Gentle is
achieved by executing the following command from the command line:
gunzip gentle-97.tar.gz
tar -xvf gentle-97.tar
This creates a directory gentle-97 with subdirectories gentle, lib, reflex, and examples.
Go to directory gentle and type:
./build
This creates the executable program gentle, the Gentle compiler, as well as the object file
grts.o, the Gentle run time system. Go to directory lib and type
./build
This compiles the modules of the user library. Go to directory reflex and type
./build
This creates the executable program reflex, a generator for Lex specifications.
A pre built software package will consists of the following files. The file build is used to
build the translator, the file trans.g is the translator written in Gentle and trans is the
executable file.
build
gen.h
gen.l
gen.lit
gen.tkn
gen.y
Ident.t
lex.yy.c
lex.yy.o
Number.t
prn.c
prn.o
String.t
trans
trans.c
trans.g
trans.o
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y.tab.c
y.tab.o
If the software package hasn't been built yet or is missing some files then executing
./build will build it and restore the files. The file trans is the executable that will be used
to run the translator.
Once the executable has been created the user must create sample test files containing
code written in α-calculus. A file extension is not required for the test files, but the test
files must reside in the directory containing the trans executable. Say, the user creates a
test file called test and wants to convert it to SOL. The conversion process is invoked by
typing ./trans test from the command line. If the input file is syntactically correct the
converted SOL file will be created and stored in out.sol.
In the next section we will begin looking at the translator is further detail, first by looking
at how the input test file is parsed and then looking at a fully worked example before
moving onto how the translator actually translates the files.
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Parsing rules
To understand how the translator converts from α-calculus to SOL one has to look at how
the code is parsed. Successful parsing is critical for the translator to work; only if the
code is parsed correctly will it get translated into SOL. First we will look at each non
terminal rule and get a better understanding of what code sections it handles and the
tokens that are created. The parser is invoked by calling Program(->P), only upon
successful return is the translator called.
Program:
•
A program of type SYSTEM returns a system of type SYSTEM like fix A = zero
will return fix A = zero as a system.
System:
•
A system can be a parallel combination of two systems like fix A = zero || fix B =
zero, where fix A = zero and fix B = zero are both of type SYSTEM
•
A system can be of the type fix A = zero, where A is an identifier of type IDENT
and zero is a process of type PROCESS
•
A system can be of the type fix fail A = zero, where A is an identifier of type
IDENT and zero is a process of type PROCESS
Process:
•
A process can be a parallel combination of two processes like zero par zero,
where zero is of type PROCESS
•
A process can be a combination of an external action and a process like integer
A(integer B).zero, where integer A(integer B) is an EXT_ACT and zero is a PROCESS
•
A process can be a combination of an internal computation and a process like if
A>5 then zero else zero.zero, where if A>5 then zero else zero is an INT_COMP and
zero is a PROCESS
•
A process can be an addition of two processes like zero pl zero, where zero is of
type PROCESS
•
A process can be of the type catch (A).zero, where A if of the type IDENT and
zero is of the type PROCESS
•
A process can be of the type failref (A), where A is of the type IDENT
•
A process can be of the type timeout 0.zero, where 0 is if type INT and zero is of
type PROCESS
•
A process can be simply A, where A is of type IDENT
•
A process can be zero
ExtAct:
•
•
•
•

An external action can be in name A, where A is of type IDENT
An external action can be name A, where A is of type IDENT
An external action can be out name A, where A is of the type IDENT
An external action can be out A, where A is of the type IDENT
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•
An external action can be open name A, where A is of the type IDENT
•
An external action can be open A, where A is of the type IDENT
•
An external action can be integer A(integer B), where integer A is of type
CHANNEL and integer B is of type VAR
•
An external action can be integer A<integer B>, where integer A is of type
CHANNEL and integer B is of type VAR
•
An external action can be integer A<A>, where integer A is of type CHANNEL
and A is of type IDENT
•
An external action can be integer A<5>, where integer A is of type CHANNEL
and 5 is of type INT
IntComp:
•
An internal computation can be let integer r=integer S:Fire(real x, real y)
instantiate integer c<integer r>, where integer is of TYPE, r is of type IDENT, integer
is of TYPE, S is of type IDENT, FIRE is of type IDENT, real x, real y are of type
VAR_LIST, integer x<integer r> is of type GEN_ACT
•
An internal computation can be let integer r=integer S:Fire() instantiate integer
c<integer r>, where integer is of TYPE, r is of type IDENT, integer is of TYPE, S is of
type IDENT, FIRE is of type IDENT, integer x<integer r> is of type GEN_ACT
•
An internal computation can be if aStatus>=0 then P else zero, where
aStatus>=0 is of type CONSTRAINT, P is of type PROCESS, zero is of type PROCESS
•
An internal computation can be integer A:B<-integer C:D, where integer is
TYPE, A is of type IDENT, integer is TYPE, B is of type IDENT, C is of type IDENT,
D is of type IDENT
GenAct:
•
A general action can be an external action like in name A, where in name A is of
type EXT_ACT
•
A general action can be a internal computation like if A>5 then zero else zero,
where if A>5 then zero else zero is of type INT_COMP
•
A general action can be a combination of general actions like if A>5 then zero
else zero dot if B>5 then zero else zero, where if A>5 then zero else zero is of type
GEN_ACT and if B>5 then zero else zero is of type GEN_ACT
Channel:
•

A channel can be integer A, where integer A is of type VAR

Varlist:
•
•

A variable list can be a single variable A, followed by a list of variables B,C,D
A variable list can be a single variable A), that is a variable followed by a brace

Constraint:
•
•

A constraint can be A > 5, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and 5 is an INT
A constraint can be A < 5, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and 5 is an INT
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•
A constraint can be A >= 5, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and 5 is an INT
•
A constraint can be A =< 5, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and 5 is an INT
•
A constraint can be A == 5, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and 5 is an INT
•
A constraint can be A > B, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and B is an
UNTYPED_VAR
•
A constraint can be A < B, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and B is an
UNTYPED_VAR
•
A constraint can be A >= B, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and B is an
UNTYPED_VAR
•
A constraint can be A =< B, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and B is an
UNTYPED_VAR
•
A constraint can be A == B, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and B is an
UNTYPED_VAR
•
A constraint can be A > B + 5, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and B is an
UNTYPED_VAR and 5 is an INT
•
A constraint can be A < B + 5, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and B is an
UNTYPED_VAR and 5 is an INT
•
A constraint can be A >= B + 5, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and B is an
UNTYPED_VAR and 5 is an INT
•
A constraint can be A =< B + 5, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and B is an
UNTYPED_VAR and 5 is an INT
•
A constraint can be A == B + 5, where A is an UNTYPED_VAR and B is an
UNTYPED_VAR and 5 is an INT
•
A constraint can be A>B && B<C, where A>B is of type CONSTRAINT and
B<C is of type CONSTRAINT
Untyped_Var:
•
•
•

An untyped variable can be ‘A’, where A is of type IDENT
An untyped variable can be ‘ ’ an empty string
An untyped variable can be A, where A is of type IDENT

Var:
•

A variable can be integer A, where integer is of TYPE and A is type IDENT

Type:
•
A type can be either integer, real, Name, bool, aldef or assignment like integer > integer

Time1:
•

A time out is an integer number, like 5
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Parsing example
Below is a sample α-calculus code that we will run through the parser to see if it correctly
parses. Once it parses we will continue into the translation phase which is discussed in
the next section.
fix Q=integer c(integer r).zero
1. The Program first calls System.
2. System calls the rule System(->atsys1(I,P)) with fix Q=integer c(integer r).zero
3. Q is IDENT and integer c(integer r).zero is PROCESS
4. The Process rule Process(->dotext(E,P)) is called with integer c(integer r) as
EXT_ACT and zero as process
5. The Ext_act rule comm(bracket(C,V))) is called with integer c as CHANNEL and
integer r as VAR
6. The Channel rule Channel(->channel(C)) is called with integer c as VAR
7. The Var rule Var(->var(T,X)) is called with integer as Type, the type rule Type(>type(T)) checks to make sure integer is a valid type.
8. The Var rule Var(->var(T,X)) is called with integer r, which in turn calls Type
with the rule Type(->type(T)) checks to make sure integer is a valid type.
9. The example has parsed out correctly and follows the grammar rules. Now we can
translate this using the action rules specified.
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Translation
The translation rules are fairly simple; once the original α-calculus code has been
successfully parsed the translator simply translates each token into its component SOL
code. The biggest problem comes when you have nested loops; in this case the translator
has to follow each branch until it reaches a base case before backtracking to the root.
Stacks are used to keep track of which loop the translator is in and how deep into a
specific branch the translator is so that when it backtracks it reaches the correct end point.
After the parser has been invoked by calling Program(->P) and has successfully returned,
the translator starts of by first setting stack and newstack to 0. Then the output file called
out.sol is created and Pretranslate(P) is called. After successful translation the output file
out.sol is closed and the program exits.
Pretranslate(P) calls Translate(P), if the input file consists of a parallel combination of
two systems then it calls Translate(P) with each otherwise it creates a basic SOL skeleton
code that includes the following type definitions: tstring=string and Name=string. (In the
event of a failure type input file Name=string is left out from the skeleton code.) Also,
dummy variables are included in the monitored, controlled and internal variables sections
to be used if no variables are declared. After this it calls the individual functions to
collect each variable type before calling TranslateProcess(P) which then translate the αcalculus code to SOL.
Each collection function first traverses the file to find each instance of the type of
variable. Once this is done it prints them out in the corresponding section in the SOL
file. The translator is designed so that even if the monitored, controlled and internal
variables are called the same thing it will still assign them correctly.
TranslateProcess(P) either calls itself it’s a parallel combination of two processes or
depending on whether its an external action or an internal computation it calls the
corresponding TranslateExt or TranslateInt respectively. TranslateExt and TranslateInt in
turn calls different print functions to convert the α-calculus code to SOL.
The cross reference guide provided in the next section provides a clear outline of how the
translator creates its tree. When a function is invoked it will execute it and all sub
functions before returning.
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Function cross reference table
The following table provides an easy function cross reference guide for each function and
what it invokes. The table also helps in understanding the recursive nature of the
program.
Function
Pretranslate
Translate

TranslateProcess

CollectMonitoredVariable

CollectMonitoredExt
CollectMonitoredInt

CollectMonitoredGen

PrintVar
CollectInternalVariable

CollectInternalExt
CollectInternalInt
CollectInternalGen

Invokes
Translate
Translate
id_to_string
Put
CollectMonitoredVariable
CollectControlledVariable
CollectInternalVariable
TranslateProcess
TranslateExt
TranslateProcess
Put
IsStack
TranslateInt
CollectMonitoredExt
CollectMonitoredVariable
CollectMonitoredInt
checkdeclaredvariable
PrintChannel
CollectMonitoredGen
CollectMonitoredVariable
Put
id_to_string
CollectMonitoredInt
CollectMonitoredExt
CollectMonitoredGen
id_to_string
Put
CollectInternalExt
CollectInternalVariable
CollectInternalInt
PrintVar
CollectInternalGen
CollectInternalVariable
CollectInternalExt
CollectInternalInt
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CollectInternalGen
CollectControlledVariable
CollectControlledExt
CollectControlledVariable
CollectControlledInt
CollectControlledExt
checkdeclaredvariable
PrintChannel
CollectControlledInt
CollectControlledGen
CollectControlledVariable
CollectControlledGen
CollectControlledExt
CollectControlledInt
CollectControlledGen
TranslateExt
InsertVar
InsertatC
Put
PrintVarEq
ChecknotVar
PrintVarChanEq
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest
PrintChanConstantEq
PrintChanIntEq
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt
eq
Put
id_to_string
InsertatCV
PrintvariableNoType
Insertattrue
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtIf
eq
Put
InsertatCV
id_to_string
PrintvariableNoType
Insertattrue
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtOtherwise eq
Put
InsertatCV
PrintvariableNoType
id_to_string
Insertattrue
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PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt

PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestif

PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestOtherwise

InsertVar

InsertatC

InsertatCV

Insertattrue
PrintVarEq
PrintVarChanEq

PrintVarChanEqOtherwise

PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestif
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestOtherwise
Printcons
Put
PushConstraintIfVar
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtIf
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition
Put
eq
Printcons
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtOtherwise
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest
PushConstraintOtherwiseVar
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt
id_to_string
Put
eq
id_to_string
Put
ne
id_to_string
Put
ne
Put
id_to_string
Put
id_to_string
eq
Put
id_to_string
Put
eq
PutI
explorestackif
Printcons
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PrintChanConstantEq

PrintChanConstantEqOtherwise

PrintChanIntEq

PrintChanIntEqOtherwise

PrintChanConstantEqif

PrintChanIntEqif

PrintVarChanEqif

ne
id_to_string
Put
eq
ne
explorestackif
id_to_string
Put
eq
PutI
ne
explorestackif
Printcons
id_to_string
Put
eq
id_to_string
Put
eq
PutI
ne
explorestackif
Printcons
id_to_string
Put
eq
PutI
ne
explorestackif
Printcons
id_to_string
Put
eq
PutI
ne
explorestackif
Printcons
id_to_string
Put
eq
PutI
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PrintC
atCvarlist

PrintRestServiceCalls

PrintAllServicesFromRest
PrintAllServicesFromRestIf

PrintAllServicesFromRestOtherwise

PushConstraintOtherwise
PushConstraintOtherwiseVar
PushConstraintOtherwiseServ
PushConstraintIf
PushConstraintIfVar
PushConstraintIfServ
CloseBrackets

CloseBracketsVar

ne
explorestackif
Printcons
id_to_string
Put
Put
id_to_string
ne
PrintvariableNoType
ContainsPrintableType
atCvarlist
Put
id_to_string
atCvarlist
PrintVarlist
PrintRestServiceCalls
PrintAllServicesFromRest
PrintAllServicesFromRestIf
PrintAllServicesFromRestOtherwise
PrintAllServicesCalls
PrintRestServiceCalls
ContainsServices
Put
Printcons
PrintAllServicesFromRest
ContainsServices
Put
Printcons
PrintAllServicesFromRest
PushConstraintOtherwise
PushConstraintOtherwiseVar
PushConstraintOtherwiseServ
PushConstraintIf
n/a
n/a
ifzero
Put
CloseBrackets
ifzero
Put
CloseBracketsVar
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CloseBracketsServ

InsertVarIf

InsertatCif

explorestackif
explorestackifnext

explorestackifVar

explorestackifServ

TranslateInt

TranslateProcessIf

ifzero
Put
CloseBracketsServ
id_to_string
Put
eq
PutI
Put
ne
explorestackif
Printcons
id_to_string
explorestackifnext
eq
Put
ne
Printcons
explorestackifnext
eq
ne
Put
Printcons
explorestackifvar
eq
ne
Printcons
explorestackifServ
ifzero
id_to_string
Put
atCvarlist
PrintVarlist
PrintRestServiceCalls
TranslateGen
PrintAllServicesFromRest
TranslateProcessIf
TranslateOtherwiseProcess
TranslateifModuleProcess
TranslateExtIf
TranslateProcessIf
IsStack
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TranslateOtherwiseProcess

TranslateExtOtherwiseModule

TranslateIntOtherwiseModule

TranslateifModuleProcess

TranslateExtIf

Put
TranslateIntIf
TranslateProcessIf
TranslateExtOtherwiseModule
TranslateOtherwiseProcess
IsStack
Put
TranslateIntOtherwiseModule
InsertVar
Put
ne
explorestackif
Printcons
PrintC
PrintVarEq
CloseBrackets
ChecknotVar
PrintVarChanEqOtherwise
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest
PrintChanConstantEqOtherwise
PrintChanIntEqOtherwise
ifzero
explorestackif
Put
Printcons
atCvarlist
id_to_string
PrintVarlist
PrintRestServiceCalls
CloseBrackets
PushConstraintOtherwise
TranslateGen
TranslateGenConsOth
PrintAllServicesFromRest
TranslateProcessIf
TranslateExtIf
TranslateifModuleProcess
TranslateIntIf
InsertVarIf
InsertatCif
PrintVarEq
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TranslateExtOth

TranslateExtOtherwise

TranslateIntIf

TranslateOtherwiseInt
TranslateOtherwiseIntRest

Put
CloseBrackets
ChecknotVar
PrintVarChanEqif
PrintAllDefinitionfromRest
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh
TranslateExtOtherwise
PrintChanConstantEqif
PrintChanIntEqif
InsertVarIf
InsertatCif
PrintVarEq
Put
CloseBrackets
PrintVarChanEqif
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh
TranslateExtOtherwise
ChecknotVar
PrintChanIntEqif
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt
ifzero
ne
explorestackif
Printcons
id_to_string
atCvarlist
PrintVarlist
PrintRestServiceCalls
ContainsServices
TranslateOtherwiseInt
CloseBrackets
TranslateGenCons
PrintAllServicesFromRest
PushConstraintIf
TranslateProcessIf
TranslateOtherwiseInt
TranslateOtherwiseIntRest
Put
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TranslateGenCons

TranslateGenConsOth

TranslateGen

Printcons

Printnumber
PrintUntypedVariable
PrintVarlist

Printvariable
PrintvariableNoType
PrintChannel
IsStack
ifzero
checkdeclaredvariable

ChecknotVar

id_to_string
atCvarlist
PrintVarlist
PrintRestServiceCalls
PrintAllServicesFromRest
TranslateOtherwiseInt
TranslateExtIf
TranslateProcessIf
TranslateIntIf
TranslateGenCons
TranslateExtOtherwiseModule
TranslateProcessIf
TranslateIntIf
TranslateGenConsOth
TranslateInt
TranslateProcess
TranslateExt
TranslateGen
PrintUntypedVariable
Put
Printnumber
Printcons
PutI
id_to_string
Put
PrintvariableNoType
Put
ne
PrintVarlist
id_to_string
Put
id_to_string
Put
id_to_string
Put
eq
eq
eq
notchannelsearch
notchannelsearchlist
eq
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notsearch
notchannelsearch
notsearchlist
notchannelsearchlist
ContainsServices
ContainsServicesInt
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition

ContainsDefinitionExt
ContainsDefinitionInt

ContainsPrintableType

ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh
id_to_string

notsearch
notsearchlist
ne
ne
notsearch
notsearchlist
notchannelsearchlist
notchannelsearch
ContainsServices
ContainsServicesInt
ContainsServices
ContainsDefinitionExt
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition
ContainsDefinitionInt
eq
ContainsDefinitionInt
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition
ContainsDefinitionExt
id_to_string
ne
ContainsPrintableType
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition
n/a
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Translation example
Now that the section of code is correctly parsed we can begin the translation process. In
this section we will see how it gets translated into SOL code.
fix Q=integer c(integer r).zero
1. First Pretranslate is called, which then calls Translate.
2. The rule Translate(atsys1(I,P)) is used, I = Q and P = integer c(integer r).zero
3. Translate then prints the following to the output file out.sol.
module Q{
type definitions
tString=string;
Name=string;
monitored variables
integer dummyMonitored;

After this CollectMonitoredVariable(P) is called, where P = integer c(integer
r).zero, upon returning from that the following is put into out.sol
controlled variables
integer dummyMonitored;
tString cServiceInvoke;

Now the translator calls CollectControlledVariable(P), where P = integer c(integer
r).zero to collect any controlled variables. Upon returning it prints the following
to out.sol.
internal variables
integer dummyMonitored;

Next we collect all internal variables by calling CollectInternalVariable(P), where
P = integer c(integer r).zero. Upon returning the following is printed to the out.sol
file.
definitions

Next the translator calls TranslateProcess(P), again with P=integer c(integer
r).zero. Once it returns from there it prints the following to the out.sol file.
}

4. Now we will look at CollectMonitoredVariable(P), where P=integer c(integer r).
zero to see how it collects the variables. The rule CollectMonitoredVariable
(dotext(E, P)) is called with E=integer c(integer r) and P=zero. This then calls
CollectMonitoredExt(E), where E=integer c(integer r) and
CollectMonitoredVariable(P), where P=zero.
5. First we look at CollectMonitoredExt(E), where E=integer c(integer r) to see what
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it does. CollectMonitoredExt(E) uses CollectMonitoredExt(comm(bracket(C,V)))
where C=integer c and V=integer r. This first checks to see C is already declared
by calling checkdeclaredvariable(C), where C=integer c. After this it calls
PrintChannel(C) with C=integer c.
6. PrintChannel(C), where C=integer c uses the rule PrintChannel(channel(var
(type(T), X))) where T=integer and X=c. It prints the following to the file out.sol.
(Note this section of code is placed right after integer dummyMonitored; in the
file.)
integer c;

7. Now we got back to Step 4 and see how CollectMonitoredVariable(P), where
P=zero is handled.
8. CollectMonitoredVariable(P) uses the rule CollectMonitoredVariable(zero) which
does nothing. We have completed the collection of monitored variables. Now we
go back and deal with the controlled variables.
9. CollectControlledVariable(P), where P=integer c(integer r).zero. The rule
CollectControlledVariable (dotext(E, P)) is called with E=integer c(integer r) and
P=zero. This then calls CollectControlledExt(E), where E=integer c(integer r)
and CollectControlledVariable(P), where P=zero.
10. First we look at CollectControlledExt(E), where E=integer c(integer r) to see what
it does. CollectControlledExt(E) uses CollectControlledExt(comm(bracket(C,V
))) where C=integer c and V=integer r. This first checks to see C is already
declared by calling checkdeclaredvariable(C), where C=integer c. Since it has
already been declared we do nothing and the function exits.
11. Now we go back to Step 9 and see how CollectControlledVariable(P), where
P=zero is handled.
12. CollectControlledVariable(P) uses the rule CollectControlledVariable(zero)
which does nothing. We have completed the collection of controlled variables.
Now we go back and deal with the internal variables.
13. CollectInternalVariable(P), where P=integer c(integer r).zero. The rule
CollectInternalVariable (dotext(E, P)) is called with E=integer c(integer r) and
P=zero. This then calls CollectInternalExt(E), where E=integer c(integer r) and
CollectInternalVariable(P), where P=zero.
14. First we look at CollectInternalExt(E), where E=integer c(integer r) to see what it
does. CollectInternalExt(E) uses CollectInternalExt(comm(bracket(C,V )))
where C=integer c and V=integer r. This then calls PrintVar(V) where V=integer
r.
15. PrintVar(V) where V=integer r uses the rule PrintVar(var(type(T),C)) with
T=integer and C=r. It prints the following to out.sol, note this appears right after
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integer dummyMonitored; in the file.
integer r;

16. So all variables have been declared and now we look at TranslateProcess(P)
where P=integer c(integer r).zero to see how that gets converted to actual SOL
code.
17. TranslateProcess(P) calls TranslateProcess(dotext(E,P)) where E=integer
c(integer r) and P=zero. This then first calls TranslateExt(E,P) where E=integer
c(interger r) and P=zero. One it returns from that it calls TranslateProcess(P)
where P=zero.
18. TranslateExt(E,P) where E=integer c(integer r) and P=zero calls
TranslateExt(comm.(bracket(C,V)),P) where C=integer c, V=integer r and
P=zero. This then first calls InsertVar(V), where V=integer r. Upon returning it
calls InsertatC(C), where C=integer c. Then it calls PrintVarEq(V,C) where
V=integer r and C=integer c. Finally it prints the following to the file before
exiting.
};

19. InsertVar(V) where V=integer r uses the rule InsertVar(var(type(T),X)), where
T=integer and X=c. This prints the following to the file in the definitions section:
r= initially 0 then

20. InsertatC(C) where C=integer c uses the rule InsertatC(channel(var(type(T),X))),
where T=integer and X=c. This prints the following to the file after r=initially 0
then
if {
[] @C(c) ->

21. PrintVarEq(V,C) where V=integer r and C=integer c uses the rule PrintVarEq
(var(type(T),X),channel(var(type(T1),Y))) where T=integer, X=r, T1=integer and
Y=c. This prints the following right after [] @C(c)->
c

22. Now we go back to Step 17 and look at TranslateProcess(P) where P=zero. This
simply does nothing. We have now successfully translated the input file.
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Thus the final translated SOL file looks like this:
module Q{
type definitions
tString=string;
Name=string;
monitored variables
integer dummyMonitored;
integer c;
controlled variables
integer dummyMonitored;
tString cServiceInvoke;
internal variables
integer dummyMonitored;
integer r;
definitions
r= initially 0 then
if {
[] @C(c) -> c
};
}
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Beyond SOL
While the α-calculus to SOL translator is a very powerful tool for creating
reactive/service-based systems, it can be taken one step further with the use of the SOL to
BPEL and SOL to Java translator.
The SOL to BPEL translator is currently under development, using the SOL to BPEL
translator one could deploy provable BPEL code that could be used for designing web
services. Given that BPEL in itself is neither provable nor verifiable one can first write
code in α-calculus, prove that it does what it intends to by a simple proof. Then, using
the α-calculus to SOL translator we can generate SOL code that is provable. Since SOL
is verifiable, the code can then be verified before passing it through the SOL to BPEL
translator.
The same principle can be used for the SOL to Java translator, while work has been
completed on the SOL to Java translator a newer version is currently under development.
Just like in the SOL to BPEL translator, we can first use the α-calculus to SOL translator
to ensure we have provable code. Since Java is neither provable nor verifiable we can
use the intermediary SOL code and ensure it is verified before passing it through the SOL
to Java translator.
In the next section we will use the α-calculus to SOL translator along with the first
generation SOL to Java translator to demonstrate how we can create provable/verifiable
Java code. The one limitation of this method is naturally in order to modify the Java code
we would have to modify the original α-calculus code to ensure that provability still
exists. Whilst this may be a little redundant, it will allow the developer to have a sense of
security knowing their modifications are still provable.
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α-calculus to SOL to Java results
We will use the same sample code as used in the parsing/translation example.
The code written in α-calculus is as follows:
fix Q=integer c(integer r).zero

Passing it through the α-calculus to SOL translator we end up with:
module Q{
type definitions
tString=string;
Name=string;
monitored variables
integer dummyMonitored;
integer c;
controlled variables
integer dummyMonitored;
tString cServiceInvoke;
internal variables
integer dummyMonitored;
integer r;
definitions
r= initially 0 then
if {
[] @C(c) ->
c
};
}

Passing the SOL code through the SOL to Java translator we get two files:
package testpackage;
import java.rmi.*;
public interface IQ{
//*************************** accessor methods *******************************
private void setdummyMonitored(int value) throws Exception;
private void setc(int value) throws Exception;
public int getdummyMonitored() throws RemoteException;
public String getcServiceInvoke() throws RemoteException;
public void reset() throws Exception;
}
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import java.util.*;
import java.io.*;
import sins.SINSAgent;
import sins.SINSVariable;
public class Q extends SINSAgent {
private INTEGER dummyMonitored = new INTEGER("monitored", "dummyMonitored");
private INTEGER c = new INTEGER("monitored", "c");
private INTEGER dummyMonitored = new INTEGER("controlled", "dummyMonitored");
private tString cServiceInvoke = new tString("controlled", "cServiceInvoke");
private INTEGER dummyMonitored = new INTEGER("internal", "dummyMonitored");
private INTEGER r = new INTEGER("internal", "r");
private Hashtable initMonVars=new Hashtable();
private String justInitialized="false";
private String timeStamp="0";
public Q(){
NAME = this.getClass().getName();
}
public Hashtable getVariables() {
Hashtable htable = new Hashtable();
htable.put("dummyMonitored", dummyMonitored.toString());
htable.put("c", c.toString());
htable.put("dummyMonitored", dummyMonitored.toString());
htable.put("cServiceInvoke", cServiceInvoke.toString());
return htable;
}

private void setAllFalse(){
dummyMonitored.setHasBeenInitialized("false");
c.setHasBeenInitialized("false");
dummyMonitored.setHasBeenInitialized("false");
cServiceInvoke.setHasBeenInitialized("false");
}
private boolean checkMonVars(){
Vector MonVars = getMonVars();
for (int i=0; i<MonVars.size(); i++)
{
if(!(initMonVars.containsKey(MonVars.elementAt(i)) ) )
return false;
}
return true;
}
private Vector getMonVars(){
Vector MonVars = new Vector();
MonVars.add("dummyMonitored");
MonVars.add("c");
return MonVars;
}
public Hashtable evaluateMonitoredVariable(String varName, String value) throws Exception {
Hashtable htable = new Hashtable();
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if(varName.equals("dummyMonitored")){
dummyMonitored.setInit("false");
dummyMonitored.setValue((Integer.valueOf(value)).intValue());
htable = evaluate();
}
else if(varName.equals("c")){
c.setInit("false");
c.setValue((Integer.valueOf(value)).intValue());
htable = evaluate();
}
else {
System.out.println("Incorrect monitored Variable");
}
return htable;
}
public Hashtable handle_variable(String varName,String value,String init,String timeStamp )
throws Exception
{
Hashtable htable = new Hashtable();
if(init.equals("true")) /* handling initialization requests */
{
if(initMonVars.isEmpty())
{
setAllFalse();
}
else
{
SINSVariable dummy = (SINSVariable) initMonVars.get(varName);
if(Long.parseLong(this.timeStamp) < Long.parseLong(timeStamp))
{
initMonVars.clear();
setAllFalse();
}
}
this.timeStamp = timeStamp;
if(varName.equals("dummyMonitored")){
dummyMonitored.setInit(init);
dummyMonitored.setValue((Integer.valueOf(value)).intValue());
dummyMonitored.setTimeStamp(timeStamp);
dummyMonitored.clearTimeStamp();
initMonVars.put("dummyMonitored",dummyMonitored);
}
else if(varName.equals("c")){
c.setInit(init);
c.setValue((Integer.valueOf(value)).intValue());
c.setTimeStamp(timeStamp);
c.clearTimeStamp();
initMonVars.put("c",c);
}
else {
System.out.println("Incorrect monitored Variable");
}
boolean allMonVarsSet = checkMonVars();
if(allMonVarsSet)
{
justInitialized = "true";
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htable = evaluate();
initMonVars.clear();
}
}
else if(init.equals("false") && !initMonVars.isEmpty()) /*If update comes in the middle of
initialization */
{
/* currently discarding if any request for update comes in between */
/* Please let us know if u want to handle these updates*/
}
else /* To handle updates after initialization */
{
htable = evaluateMonitoredVariable(varName,value);
}
return htable;
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see container.services.ai.agent.AgentObject#evaluateInterface(java.lang.String)
*/
public void evaluateInterface (String interfaceName) throws Exception {
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see container.services.ai.agent.AgentObject#getInterfaces()
*/
public Hashtable getInterfaces () throws Exception {
return null;
}

/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see sins.agent.AgentObject#getControlledVariable()
*/
public ArrayList getControlledVariables() throws Exception {
ArrayList a1 = new ArrayList();
a1.add(dummyMonitored);
a1.add(cServiceInvoke);
return a1;
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see sins.agent.AgentObject#getMonitoredVariable()
*/
public ArrayList getMonitoredVariables() throws Exception {
ArrayList a1 = new ArrayList();
a1.add(dummyMonitored);
a1.add(c);
return a1;
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see sins.agent.AgentObject#getMonitoredVariable()
*/
public ArrayList getInternalVariables() throws Exception {
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ArrayList a1 = new ArrayList();
a1.add(dummyMonitored);
a1.add(r);
return a1;
}
/******************** START ACCESSOR METHODS**********************/
public void setDUMMYMONITORED(int value) throws Exception{
dummyMonitored.setValue(value);
}
public void setC(int value) throws Exception{
c.setValue(value);
}
public INTEGER getDUMMYMONITORED() throws Exception{
return dummyMonitored;
}
public tString getCSERVICEINVOKE() throws Exception{
return cServiceInvoke;
}
/******************** END ACCESSOR METHODS**********************/
public Hashtable evaluate() throws Exception {
System.out.println("evaluate() ##1 called");
boolean flag = false;
if(justInitialized.equals("true")){
r.setValue(0);
}
else {
if(c.getChanged()||justInitialized.equals("true"))
{
// ***************************
flag=false;
if((c.getChanged()))
{
r.setValue(c.getVal());
flag=true;
}
}
}
Hashtable htable = new Hashtable();
if(justInitialized.equals("true")){
dummyMonitored.setTimeStamp(this.timeStamp);
dummyMonitored.clearTimeStamp();
dummyMonitored.setInit(justInitialized);
htable.put("dummyMonitored", dummyMonitored.toString());
cServiceInvoke.setTimeStamp(this.timeStamp);
cServiceInvoke.clearTimeStamp();
cServiceInvoke.setInit(justInitialized);
htable.put("cServiceInvoke", cServiceInvoke.toString());
}
else {
if(dummyMonitored.getChanged())
{
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dummyMonitored.setTimeStamp(this.timeStamp);
dummyMonitored.increaseTimeStamp();
dummyMonitored.setInit(justInitialized);
htable.put("dummyMonitored", dummyMonitored.toString());
}
if(cServiceInvoke.getChanged())
{
cServiceInvoke.setTimeStamp(this.timeStamp);
cServiceInvoke.increaseTimeStamp();
cServiceInvoke.setInit(justInitialized);
htable.put("cServiceInvoke", cServiceInvoke.toString());
}
}
justInitialized ="false";
dummyMonitored.setChanged(false);
c.setChanged(false);
dummyMonitored.setChanged(false);
r.setChanged(false);
dummyMonitored.setChanged(false);
cServiceInvoke.setChanged(false);
return htable;
}

public ArrayList getGroups() throws Exception {
ArrayList a1 = new ArrayList();
a1.add("dummyMonitored");
a1.add("c");
return a1;
}
/* Start of Type Definitions */

class Name implements SINSVariable{
private String type = null;
private String name = null;
private String prev_name,name;
private String init;
private String hasBeenInitialized = "false";
private long ts=0;
boolean changed=false;
public Name(String t,String n,String v){
setType(t);
setName(n);
this.name = v;
prev_name=name;
}
public Name(String t,String n){
setType(t);
setName(n);
this.name = "";
prev_name=name;
}
public String toString(){
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return String.valueOf(name);
}
public void setValue(String dummy){
this.increaseTimeStamp();
if(type.equals("monitored"))
{
if(init.equals("true"))
{
prev_name=dummy;
name=dummy;
hasBeenInitialized = "true";
}
else
{
prev_name=name;
name=dummy;
}
}
else
{
if(init == null||hasBeenInitialized.equals("false"))
{
prev_name=dummy;
name=dummy;
hasBeenInitialized = "true";
init = "true";
}
else
{
prev_name=name;
name=dummy;
init = "false";
}
}
changed = true;
}
public String getPrev(){
return prev_name;
}
public void setPrev(String dummy){
prev_name=dummy;
}
public String getName(){
return name;
}
public String getVal(){
return name;
}
public String getValue(){
return String.valueOf(name);
}
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public String getPrevString(){
return String.valueOf(prev_name);
}
public String getType(){
return type;
}
public void setName(String n){
name = n;
}
public void setType(String t){
type = t;
}
public void setInit(String init){
this.init = init;
}
public void setTimeStamp(String ts){
this.ts = Long.parseLong(ts);
}
public long getTimeStamp(){
return ts;
}
public void increaseTimeStamp(){
this.ts ++;
}
public void clearTimeStamp(){
this.ts = 0;
}
public String getInit(){
return init;
}
public void setHasBeenInitialized(String hasBeenInitialized){
this.hasBeenInitialized = hasBeenInitialized;
}
public String getHasBeenInitialized(){
return
this.hasBeenInitialized;
}
public boolean getChanged(){
return changed;
}
public void setChanged(boolean flag){
changed =flag;
}
}
class tString implements SINSVariable{
private String type = null;
private String name = null;
private String prev_tstring,tstring;
private String init;
private String hasBeenInitialized = "false";
private long ts=0;
boolean changed=false;
public tString(String t,String n,String v){
setType(t);
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setName(n);
this.tstring = v;
prev_tstring=tstring;
}
public tString(String t,String n){
setType(t);
setName(n);
this.tstring = "";
prev_tstring=tstring;
}
public String toString(){
return String.valueOf(tstring);
}
public void setValue(String dummy){
this.increaseTimeStamp();
if(type.equals("monitored"))
{
if(init.equals("true"))
{
prev_tstring=dummy;
tstring=dummy;
hasBeenInitialized = "true";
}
else
{
prev_tstring=tstring;
tstring=dummy;
}
}
else
{
if(init == null||hasBeenInitialized.equals("false"))
{
prev_tstring=dummy;
tstring=dummy;
hasBeenInitialized = "true";
init = "true";
}
else
{
prev_tstring=tstring;
tstring=dummy;
init = "false";
}
}
changed = true;
}
public String getPrev(){
return prev_tstring;
}
public void setPrev(String dummy){
prev_tstring=dummy;
}
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public String getName(){
return name;
}
public String getVal(){
return tstring;
}
public String getValue(){
return String.valueOf(tstring);
}
public String getPrevString(){
return String.valueOf(prev_tstring);
}
public String getType(){
return type;
}
public void setName(String n){
name = n;
}
public void setType(String t){
type = t;
}
public void setInit(String init){
this.init = init;
}
public void setTimeStamp(String ts){
this.ts = Long.parseLong(ts);
}
public long getTimeStamp(){
return ts;
}
public void increaseTimeStamp(){
this.ts ++;
}
public void clearTimeStamp(){
this.ts = 0;
}
public String getInit(){
return init;
}
public void setHasBeenInitialized(String hasBeenInitialized){
this.hasBeenInitialized = hasBeenInitialized;
}
public String getHasBeenInitialized(){
return
this.hasBeenInitialized;
}
public boolean getChanged(){
return changed;
}
public void setChanged(boolean flag){
changed =flag;
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}
}
class INTEGER implements SINSVariable{
private String type = null;
private String name = null;
private int prev_yint,yint;
private String init;
private String hasBeenInitialized = "false";
private long ts=0;
private boolean changed=false;
public INTEGER(String t,String n,int v){
setType(t);
setName(n);
this.yint = v;
prev_yint=yint;
}
public INTEGER(String t,String n){
setType(t);
setName(n);
}
public String toString(){
return String.valueOf(yint);
}
public void setValue(int dummy){
if(type.equals("monitored"))
{
if(init.equals("true"))
{
prev_yint=dummy;
yint=dummy;
hasBeenInitialized = "true";
}
else
{
prev_yint=yint;
yint=dummy;
}
}
else
{
if(init == null||hasBeenInitialized.equals("false"))
{
prev_yint=dummy;
yint=dummy;
hasBeenInitialized = "true";
init = "true";
}
else
{
prev_yint=yint;
yint=dummy;
init = "false";
}
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}
changed = true;
}
public int getPrev(){
return prev_yint;
}
public void setPrev(int dummy){
prev_yint=dummy;
}
public String getName(){
return name;
}
public int getVal(){
return yint;
}
public String getValue(){
return String.valueOf(yint);
}
public String getPrevString(){
return String.valueOf(prev_yint);
}
public String getType(){
return type;
}
public void setName(String n){
name = n;
}
public void setType(String t){
type = t;
}
public void setInit(String init){
this.init = init;
}
public void setTimeStamp(String ts){
this.ts = Long.parseLong(ts);
}
public long getTimeStamp(){
return ts;
}
public void increaseTimeStamp(){
this.ts ++;
}
public void clearTimeStamp(){
this.ts = 0;
}
public String getInit(){
return init;
}
public void setHasBeenInitialized(String hasBeenInitialized){
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this.hasBeenInitialized = hasBeenInitialized;
}
public String getHasBeenInitialized(){
return
this.hasBeenInitialized;
}
public boolean getChanged(){
return changed;
}
public void setChanged(boolean flag){
changed =flag;
}
}
/* End of Type Definitions */

}
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TEST RESULTS
The testing process was divided into three stages, the first involved using very simple αcalculus code to ensure the structure of the SOL code generated was correct. The second
stage involved writing more complex code in α-calculus, the testing of loops and
conditionals was done in this stage. The second stage was the most arduous as the
generated SOL code had to be analyzed in detail to ensure that it was syntactically and
logically correct. The final testing stage was done with two pieces of α-calculus code
that had already been converted to SOL by hand. The hand generated code was
compared to the machine generated code to test its correctness. The sample file used was
supplied by Arizona State University.

Test Phase 1: syntax and logic testing
Input File 1:
fix MA = Name a(Name b).zero

Output File 1:
module MA{
type definitions
tString=string;
Name=string;
monitored variables
integer dummyMonitored;
Name a;
controlled variables
integer dummyMonitored;
tString cServiceInvoke;
internal variables
integer dummyMonitored;
Name b;
definitions
b= initially null then
if {
[] @C(a) ->
a
};
}

57

Input File 2:
fix MA = integer c<2>.zero

Output File 2:
module MA{
type definitions
tString=string;
Name=string;
monitored variables
integer dummyMonitored;
controlled variables
integer dummyMonitored;
tString cServiceInvoke;
integer c;
internal variables
integer dummyMonitored;
definitions
c= initially 0 then if{
[] "true" -> 2
};
}
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Test Phase 2: syntax, logic, loops and conditionals testing
Input File 3:
fix PDAgent = let integer n = integer CAR:dispatchCAR(integer loc, integer where) instantiate let
Name p=Name CAR:setupPerimeter(integer loc) instantiate if p==setup then Name
m<perimeterSetupSuccess>.zero else Name m<perimeterSetupFail>.zero.zero

Output File 3:
module PDAgent{
type definitions
tString=string;
Name=string;
monitored variables
integer dummyMonitored;
integer n;
Name p;
controlled variables
integer dummyMonitored;
tString cServiceInvoke;
Name m;
internal variables
integer dummyMonitored;
definitions
cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {
[]@C( loc) & @C( where) -> "CAR:dispatchCAR(" + loc + "," + where + ","+"n" + ")"
[]@C( loc) -> "CAR:setupPerimeter(" + loc + ","+"p" + ")"
};
m= initially null then if{
[] @T(p==setup) -> if{
[] "true" ->"perimeterSetupSuccess"}
otherwise ->if{
[] "true" ->"perimeterSetupFail"
}};
}
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Input File 4:
fix AMBAgent=integer o(integer loc).let Name n=Name AMB:dispatchAMB(integer loc)
instantiate Name f(Name people).if people==noInjuredPassenger then Name i<rescued>.zero else
let Name status=Name AMB:getInjuryStatus(integer n, Name people) instantiate if status==minor
then Name c<notNeedHelicopter>.let Name result=Name AMB:sendHospital(Name people)
instantiate Name i<Name result>.zero else Name c<needHelicopter>.Name d<Name
people>.zero.zero.zero

Output File 4:
module AMBAgent{
type definitions
tString=string;
Name=string;
monitored variables
integer dummyMonitored;
integer o;
Name n;
Name f;
Name status;
Name result;
controlled variables
integer dummyMonitored;
tString cServiceInvoke;
Name i;
Name c;
Name d;
internal variables
integer dummyMonitored;
integer loc;
Name people;
definitions
loc= initially 0 then
if {
[] @C(o) ->
o
};
cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {
[]@C( loc) -> "AMB:dispatchAMB(" + loc + ","+"n" + ")"
[] "true" ->if{
[]@T(people==noInjuredPassenger) -> otherwise ->if{
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[]@C( n) & @C( people) -> "AMB:getInjuryStatus(" + n + "," + people + ","+"status" + ")"
[] "true" ->if{
[] @T(status==minor) -> if{
[]@C( people) -> "AMB:sendHospital(" + people + ","+"result" + ")"
}
}
}
}
};
people= initially null then
if {
[] @C(f) ->
f
};
i= initially null then if{
[] @T(people==noInjuredPassenger) -> if{
[] "true" ->"rescued"}
otherwise ->if{
[]@T(status==minor) ->
if {
[] @C(result) ->
result}
}
};
c= initially null then if{
[] @T(people==noInjuredPassenger) ->
otherwise -> if{
[] @T(status==minor) -> if{
[] "true" ->"notNeedHelicopter"}
otherwise ->if{
[] "true" ->"needHelicopter"
}}
}
;
d= initially null then if{
[] @T(people==noInjuredPassenger) ->
otherwise -> if{
[] @T(status==minor) ->
otherwise -> if{
[] @C(people) ->people
}
}
}
;
}
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Test Phase 3: testing with files supplied by ASU
Input File 5 – AMBAgent
fix AMBAgent=integer o(integer loc).let Name n=Name AMB:dispatchAMB(integer loc) instantiate Name
f(Name people).if people==''then Name i<rescued>.zero else if people>'' then let Name status=Name
AMB:getInjuryStatus(aldef loc, Name people) instantiate if status=='minor' then Name
c<notNeedHelicopter>.let Name result=Name AMB:sendHospital(aldef people) instantiate Name i<Name
result>.zero else Name c<needHelicopter>.integer h<aldef loc>.Name d<aldef people>.zero.zero else
zero.zero.zero

Output File 5 – AMBAgent.sol
module AMBAgent{
type definitions
tString=string;
Name=string;
monitored variables
integer dummyMonitored;
integer o;
Name n;
Name f;
Name status;
Name result;
controlled variables
integer dummyMonitored;
tString cServiceInvoke;
Name i;
Name c;
integer h;
Name d;
internal variables
integer dummyMonitored;
integer loc;
Name people;
definitions
loc= initially 0 then
if {
[] @C(o) ->
o
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};
cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {
[]@C( loc) -> "AMB:dispatchAMB(" + loc + ","+"n" + ")"
[] "true" ->if{
[]@T(people=="") -> otherwise ->if{
[] "true" ->if{
[] @T(people>"") -> if{
[]@C( people) -> "AMB:getInjuryStatus(" + loc + "," + people + ","+"status" + ")"
[] "true" ->if{
[] @T(status=="minor") -> if{
[] -> "AMB:sendHospital(" + people + ","+"result" + ")"
}
}
}
}
}
}
};
people= initially null then
if {
[] @C(f) ->
f
};
i= initially null then if{

[] @T(people=="") -> if{
[] "true" ->"rescued"}
otherwise ->if{
[]@T(people>"") -> if{
[]@T(status=="minor") ->
if {
[] @C(result) ->
result}
}

}
};

c= initially null then if{
[] @T(people=="") ->
otherwise -> if{
[] @T(people>"") -> if{

[] @T(status=="minor") -> if{
[] "true" ->"notNeedHelicopter"}
otherwise ->if{
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[] "true" ->"needHelicopter"
}}
}
}
;

h= initially 0 then if{
[] @T(people=="") ->
otherwise -> if{
[] @T(people>"") -> if{

[] @T(status=="minor") ->
otherwise -> if{
[] "true" ->loc}
}
}
}
;
d= initially null then if{
[] @T(people=="") ->
otherwise -> if{
[] @T(people>"") -> if{

[] @T(status=="minor") ->
otherwise -> if{
[] "true" ->people}
}
}
}
;
}
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CONCLUSION
The concept of service based systems and web services is fairly new, whether it will be
the future of the computer industry or the flavor of the week remains to be seen.
In the meantime, is the approach described in my thesis the proverbial silver bullet
solution, which software engineers keep talking about, to all our service based system
needs? In a short answer yes, it certainly allows a developer to create provable code in a
low level language that can be ported into a high level language and used in multiple
scenarios.
But, the technique that makes this solution work is the same one that could cause
problems in some cases. α-calculus is not a very common programming language like C
or C++; hence a developer would need to learn how to code in α-calculus first. The
language is still fairly easy to learn, although some of the syntax can be counterintuitive
at times. Naturally one would ask why not just build the translator from C/C++, the
reason is that those and other high level languages are not provable and as a result it
would serve no purpose to develop a translator from those languages to SOL. In a sense
the learning curve to master α-calculus is a very small price to pay to get provable code.
Finally, even though α-calculus is provable, the translator from it to SOL hasn’t been
proven yet. Naturally, given more time this would be the next step in forming an even
more robust solution.
Work has been completed on a SOL to Java translator and a SOL to BPEL translator is
being developed. This opens up further expansion possibilities for the α-calculus to SOL
translator. One can now deploy Java or BPEL source code for business processes that are
provable.
Finally, was using Gentle as a construction tool the best idea? Yes, when I checked the C
source code generated by Gentle I quickly realized that coding this in a more standard
language like C or C++ would have taken infinitely longer. Using a language like Gentle
helped reduce the number of lines of code, and as a result made the debugging process a
whole lot easier.
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SOURCE CODE
'root' Program(->P)
print(P)
stack <- 0
newstack <- 0
OpenOutput("out.sol")
Pretranslate(P)
CloseOutput
'type' IDENT
'type' TYPE
type(IDENT)
func(TYPE,TYPE)
'type' CHANNEL
channel(VAR)
'type' SYSTEM
par(SYSTEM,SYSTEM)
atsys1(IDENT,PROCESS)
fail1(IDENT,PROCESS)
nil
'type' PROCESS
zero
parproc(PROCESS,PROCESS)
dotext(EXT_ACT,PROCESS)
dotint(INT_COMP,PROCESS)
plus(PROCESS,PROCESS)
dotcat(CATCH,PROCESS)
failure(IDENT)
dottime(TIMEOUT,PROCESS)
id_process(IDENT)
'type' EXT_ACT
move(M)
comm(K)
'type' GEN_ACT
genexact(EXT_ACT)
genincomp(INT_COMP)
dotgenact(GEN_ACT,GEN_ACT)
'type' INT_COMP
let_instantiate(VAR,BASIC_INT_COMP,GEN_ACT)
if_then_else(BOOLEAN_INT_COMP,PROCESS,PROCESS)
assign(TYPE,IDENT,IDENT,TYPE,IDENT,IDENT)
epsilon
bottom
'type' BASIC_INT_COMP
method(TYPE,IDENT,IDENT,VARLIST)
'type' BOOLEAN_INT_COMP
cons(CONSTRAINT)
tt
ff
'type' CONSTRAINT
gtc(UNTYPED_VAR,INT)
ltc(UNTYPED_VAR,INT)
geq(UNTYPED_VAR,INT)
leq(UNTYPED_VAR,INT)
eqeqcons(UNTYPED_VAR,INT)
gtcv(UNTYPED_VAR,UNTYPED_VAR)
ltcv(UNTYPED_VAR,UNTYPED_VAR)
geqv(UNTYPED_VAR,UNTYPED_VAR)
leqv(UNTYPED_VAR,UNTYPED_VAR)
eqeq(UNTYPED_VAR,UNTYPED_VAR)
gtcvc(UNTYPED_VAR,UNTYPED_VAR,INT)
ltcvc(UNTYPED_VAR,UNTYPED_VAR,INT)
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geqvc(UNTYPED_VAR,UNTYPED_VAR,INT)
leqvc(UNTYPED_VAR,UNTYPED_VAR,INT)
eqeqc(UNTYPED_VAR,UNTYPED_VAR,INT)
and(CONSTRAINT,CONSTRAINT)
'type' M
in(N)
out(N)
open(N)
epsilon
'type' K
bracket(CHANNEL,VAR)
angle(CHANNEL,VAR)
send(CHANNEL,IDENT)
send1(CHANNEL,INT)
'type' N
name_variable(IDENT)
name(IDENT)
'type' VARLIST
varlist(VAR,VARLIST)
nil
'type' UNTYPED_VAR
untyped_var(IDENT)
untyped_string(IDENT)
empty_string
'type' VAR
var(TYPE,IDENT)
'type' CATCH
catch(IDENT)
'type' TIMEOUT
timeout(INT)
'type' ID
id(IDENT)
'type' VARPAIR
varpair(CHANNEL,INT)
'type' BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_PAIR
intpair(BOOLEAN_INT_COMP,INT)
'type' CHECKLIST
lst(VARPAIR,CHECKLIST)
nil
'type' BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST
conlist(BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST,BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_PAIR)
nil
'type' CHANLIST
chanlist(CHANNEL,CHANLIST)
nil
'var' checkl:CHECKLIST
'var' ifc: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST
'var' ifc1: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST
'token' Ident(->IDENT)
'token' Number(->INT)
'var' stack: INT
'var' newstack: INT
'var' newstackvar: INT
'var' newstackserv: INT
'var' service: INT
'var' TempConsList: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST
'var' VarConsList: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST

68

'var' ServConsList: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST
'var' declaredvariable: CHANLIST
'var' countif:INT
'var' countifinner:INT
/*---------------------NON TERMINALS--------------------------------------------------*/
/*----------------------PROGRAM-----------------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' Program(->SYSTEM)
'rule' Program(->P):
System(->P)

/*----------------------SYSTEM------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' System(->SYSTEM)
'rule' System(->par(S1,S2)):
System(->S1)
"||"
System(->S2)
'rule' System(->atsys1(I,P)):
"fix"
Ident(->I)
"="
Process(->P)
'rule' System(->fail1(I,P)):
"fix fail"
Ident(->I)
"="
Process(->P)

/*--------------------PROCESS-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' Process(->PROCESS)
'rule' Process(->parproc(P,Q)):
Process(->P)
"par"
Process(->Q)
'rule' Process(->dotext(E,P)):
ExtAct(->E)
"."
Process(->P)
'rule' Process(->dotint(C,P)):
IntComp(->C)
"."
Process(->P)
'rule' Process(->plus(P,Q)):
Process(->P)
"pl"
Process(->Q)
'rule' Process(->dotcat(catch(I),P)):
"catch"
"("
Ident(->I)
")"
"."
Process(->P)
'rule' Process(->failure(I)):
"failref"
"("
Ident(->I)
")"
'rule' Process(->dottime(T,P)):
"timeout"
Time1(->T)
"."
Process(->P)
'rule' Process(->id_process(P)):
Ident(->P)
'rule' Process(->zero):
"zero"
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/*------------------------------------EXTERNAL ACTION-------------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' ExtAct(->EXT_ACT)
'rule' ExtAct(->move(in(name_variable(N)))):
"in"
"name"
Ident(->N)
'rule' ExtAct(->move(in(name(N)))):
"in"
Ident(->N)
'rule' ExtAct(->move(out(name_variable(N)))):
"out"
"name"
Ident(->N)
'rule' ExtAct(->move(out(name(N)))):
"out"
Ident(->N)
'rule' ExtAct(->move(open(name_variable(N)))):
"open"
"name"
Ident(->N)
'rule' ExtAct(->move(open(name(N)))):
"open"
Ident(->N)
'rule' ExtAct(->comm(bracket(C,V))):
Channel(->C)
"("
Var(->V)
")"
'rule' ExtAct(->comm(angle(C,V))):
Channel(->C)
"<"
Var(->V)
">"
'rule' ExtAct(->comm(send(C,U))):
Channel(->C)
"<"
Ident(->U)
">"
'rule' ExtAct(->comm(send1(C,U))):
Channel(->C)
"<"
Number(->U)
">"

/*------------------------------------INTERNAL COMPUTATION-----------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' IntComp(->INT_COMP)
'rule' IntComp(->let_instantiate(var(T,X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),C)):
"let"
Type(->T)
Ident(->X)
"="
Type(->T1)
Ident(->I)
":"
Ident(->J)
"("
Var(->V)
","
Varlist(->L)
"instantiate"
GenAct(->C)
eq(T,T1)
'rule' IntComp(->let_instantiate(var(T,X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,nil)),C)):
"let"
Type(->T)
Ident(->X)
"="
Type(->T1)
Ident(->I)
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":"
Ident(->J)
"("
Var(->V)
")"
"instantiate"
GenAct(->C)
eq(T,T1)
'rule' IntComp(->let_instantiate(var(T,X),method(T1,I,J,nil),C)):
"let"
Type(->T)
Ident(->X)
"="
Type(->T1)
Ident(->I)
":"
Ident(->J)
"("
")"
"instantiate"
GenAct(->C)
eq(T,T1)
'rule' IntComp(->if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q)):
"if"
Constraint(->Cons)
"then"
Process(->P)
"else"
Process(->Q)
'rule' IntComp(->assign(T1,I,J,T2,K,L)):
Type(->T1)
Ident(->I)
":"
Ident(->J)
"<-"
Type(->T2)
Ident(->K)
":"
Ident(->L)
eq(T1,T2)

/*-----------------------------------GENERAL ACTIONS------------------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' GenAct(->GEN_ACT)
'rule' GenAct(->genexact(E)):
ExtAct(->E)
'rule' GenAct(->genincomp(C)):
IntComp(->C)
'rule' GenAct(->dotgenact(C,D)):
GenAct(->C)
"dot"
GenAct(->D)

/*------------------------------------CHANNEL--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' Channel(->CHANNEL)
'rule' Channel(->channel(C)):
Var(->C)

/*---------------------------------VARIABLE LIST------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' Varlist(->VARLIST)
'rule' Varlist(->varlist(V,Vs)):
Var(->V)
","
Varlist(->Vs)
'rule' Varlist(->varlist(V,nil)):
Var(->V)
")"

71

/*--------------------------------CONSTRAINTS---------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' Constraint(->CONSTRAINT)
'rule' Constraint(->gtc(U,V)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
">"
Number(->V)
'rule' Constraint(->ltc(U,V)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
"<"
Number(->V)
'rule' Constraint(->geq(U,V)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
">="
Number(->V)
'rule' Constraint(->leq(U,V)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
"=<"
Number(->V)
'rule' Constraint(->eqeqcons(U,V)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
"=="
Number(->V)
'rule' Constraint(->gtcv(U,V)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
">"
Untyped_Var(->V)
'rule' Constraint(->ltcv(U,V)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
"<"
Untyped_Var(->V)
'rule' Constraint(->leqv(U,V)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
"=<"
Untyped_Var(->V)
'rule' Constraint(->geqv(U,V)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
">="
Untyped_Var(->V)
'rule' Constraint(->eqeq(U,V)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
"=="
Untyped_Var(->V)
'rule' Constraint(->gtcvc(U,V,C)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
">"
Untyped_Var(->V)
"+"
Number(->C)
'rule' Constraint(->ltcvc(U,V,C)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
"<"
Untyped_Var(->V)
"+"
Number(->C)
'rule' Constraint(->leqvc(U,V,C)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
"=<"
Untyped_Var(->V)
"+"
Number(->C)
'rule' Constraint(->geqvc(U,V,C)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
">="
Untyped_Var(->V)
"+"
Number(->C)
'rule' Constraint(->eqeqc(U,V,C)):
Untyped_Var(->U)
"=="
Untyped_Var(->V)
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"+"
Number(->C)
'rule' Constraint(->and(U,V)):
Constraint(->U)
"&&"
Constraint(->V)

/*------------------------------------UNTYPED VARIABLE----------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' Untyped_Var(->UNTYPED_VAR)
'rule' Untyped_Var(->untyped_string(X)):
"'"
Ident(->X)
"'"
'rule' Untyped_Var(->empty_string):
"'"
"'"
'rule' Untyped_Var(->untyped_var(X)):
Ident(->X)

/*----------------------------------------VARIABLE--------------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' Var(->VAR)
'rule' Var(->var(T,X)):
Type(->T)
Ident(->X)

/*-----------------------------------------------TYPE-----------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' Type(->TYPE)
'rule' Type(->type(T)):
Ident(->T)
id_to_string(T->T1)
(| eq(T1,"integer")
|| eq(T1,"real")
|| eq(T1,"Name")
|| eq(T1,"bool")
|| eq(T1,"aldef")|)
'rule' Type(->func(T,S)):
Type(->T)
"->"
Type(->S)

/*------------------------------------------TIME OUT------------------------------------------------------*/
'nonterm' Time1(->TIMEOUT)
'rule' Time1(->timeout(T)):
Number(->T)
'var' Temp: STRING
'action' OpenOutput(STRING)
'action' CloseOutput
'action' Put(STRING)
'action' PutI(INT)
'action' Nl
'action' Kprintc(STRING)
'action' Kprints(IDENT)

/*-----------------------------------TRANSLATION------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' Pretranslate(Pr:SYSTEM)
'rule' Pretranslate(Pr):
Translate(Pr)
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'action' Translate(Pr: SYSTEM)
'rule' Translate(par(S1,S2)):
Translate(S1)
Translate(S2)
'rule' Translate(atsys1(I,P)):
Nl service<-0
checkl<-nil
ifc<-nil
ifc1<-nil
TempConsList<-nil
VarConsList<- nil
ServConsList<-nil
newstack<-0
newstackvar<-0
newstackserv<-0
countif<-0
countifinner<-0
declaredvariable<- nil
Put("module ")
id_to_string(I->M)
Put(M)Put("{")
Nl Put("type definitions")
Nl Put("tString=string;")
Nl Put("Name=string;")
Nl Put("monitored variables")
Nl Put("integer dummyMonitored;")
Nl CollectMonitoredVariable(P)
Nl Put("controlled variables")
Nl Put("integer dummyMonitored;")
Nl Put("tString cServiceInvoke;")
Nl CollectControlledVariable(P)
Nl Put("internal variables")
Nl Put("integer dummyMonitored;")
Nl CollectInternalVariable(P)
Nl Put("definitions")
Nl TranslateProcess(P)
Nl Put("}")
Nl service<-0
'rule' Translate(fail1(I,P)):
Nl service<-0
checkl<-nil
ifc<-nil
TempConsList<-nil
VarConsList<- nil
ServConsList<-nil
newstack<-0
newstackvar<-0
newstackserv<-0
declaredvariable<- nil
countif<-0
Put("module ")
id_to_string(I->M)
Put("fail_")
Put(M)
Put("{")
Nl Put("type definitions")
Nl Put("tString=string;")
Nl Put("monitored variables")
Nl CollectMonitoredVariable(P)
Nl Put("controlled variables")
Nl Put("tString cServiceInvoke;")
Nl CollectControlledVariable(P)
Nl Put("internal variables")
Nl CollectInternalVariable(P)
Nl Put("definitions")
Nl TranslateProcess(P)
Nl Put("}")
Nl service<- 0

/*-----------------------------------TRANSLATE A PROCESS---------------------------------------------------------*/
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'action' TranslateProcess(P: PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateProcess(zero)
'rule' TranslateProcess(dotext(E,P)):
TranslateExt(E,P)
TranslateProcess(P)
(| IsStack(0)
Put("")
|| Put("}")
stack->N
stack<-N-1 |)
'rule' TranslateProcess(dotint(C,P)):
TranslateInt(C,P)
TranslateProcess(P)
'rule' TranslateProcess(parproc(P,Q)):
TranslateProcess(P)
TranslateProcess(Q)

/*----------------------------------COLLECT MONITORED VARIABLES--------------------------------------------------*/
'action' CollectMonitoredVariable(P:PROCESS)
'rule' CollectMonitoredVariable(zero)
'rule' CollectMonitoredVariable(dotext(E,P)):
CollectMonitoredExt(E)
CollectMonitoredVariable(P)
'rule' CollectMonitoredVariable(dotint(C,P)):
CollectMonitoredInt(C)
CollectMonitoredVariable(P)
'rule' CollectMonitoredVariable(parproc(P,Q)):
CollectMonitoredVariable(P)
CollectMonitoredVariable(Q)

/*---------------------------------COLLECT MONITORED VARIABLES EXTERNAL ACTIONS----------------------------------*/
'action' CollectMonitoredExt(E: EXT_ACT)
'rule' CollectMonitoredExt(comm(bracket(C,V))):
(|checkdeclaredvariable(C)
PrintChannel(C)
declaredvariable -> L
declaredvariable <- chanlist(C,L)
|| |)
'rule' CollectMonitoredExt(comm(angle(C,V)))
'rule' CollectMonitoredExt(comm(send(C,U)))
'rule' CollectMonitoredExt(comm(send1(C,U)))

/*---------------------------------COLLECT MONITORED VARIABLES INTERNAL COMPUTATIONS------------------------------*/
'action' CollectMonitoredInt(C:INT_COMP)
'rule' CollectMonitoredInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),C)):
Nl id_to_string(T->T0)
Put(T0)
id_to_string(X->K)
Put(" ")
Put(K)
Put(";")
Nl CollectMonitoredGen(C)
'rule' CollectMonitoredInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),C)):
Nl id_to_string(T->T0)
Put(T0)
id_to_string(X->K)
Put(" ")
Put(K)
Put(";")
Nl CollectMonitoredGen(C)
'rule' CollectMonitoredInt(if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q)):
CollectMonitoredVariable(P)
CollectMonitoredVariable(Q)
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/*---------------------------------COLLECT MONITORED VARIABLES GENERAL ACTIONS------------------------------------*/
'action' CollectMonitoredGen(C:GEN_ACT)
'rule' CollectMonitoredGen(genexact(C)):
CollectMonitoredExt(C)
'rule' CollectMonitoredGen(genincomp(C)):
CollectMonitoredInt(C)
'rule' CollectMonitoredGen(dotgenact(C,D)):
CollectMonitoredGen(C)
CollectMonitoredGen(D)

/*--------------------------------PRINT VARIABLES-----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintVar(C: VAR)
'rule' PrintVar(var(type(T),C)):
Nl id_to_string(T->T0)
Put(T0)
Put(" ")
id_to_string(C->D)
Put(D)
Put(";") Nl

/*--------------------------------COLLECT INTERNAL VARIABLES------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' CollectInternalVariable(P: PROCESS)
'rule' CollectInternalVariable(zero)
'rule' CollectInternalVariable(dotext(E,P)):
CollectInternalExt(E)
CollectInternalVariable(P)
'rule' CollectInternalVariable(dotint(C,P)):
CollectInternalInt(C)
CollectInternalVariable(P)
'rule' CollectInternalVariable(parproc(P,Q)):
CollectInternalVariable(P)
CollectInternalVariable(Q)

/*-------------------------------COLLECT INTERNAL VARIABLES EXTERNAL ACTIONS---------------------------------------*/
'action' CollectInternalExt(E: EXT_ACT)
'rule' CollectInternalExt(comm(bracket(C,V))):
PrintVar(V)
'rule' CollectInternalExt(comm(angle(C,V)))
'rule' CollectInternalExt(comm(send(C,U)))
'rule' CollectInternalExt(comm(send1(C,U)))

/*------------------------------COLLECT INTERNAL VARIABLES INTERNAL COMPUTATIONS-----------------------------------*/
'action' CollectInternalInt(C:INT_COMP)
'rule' CollectInternalInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),C)):
CollectInternalGen(C)
'rule' CollectInternalInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),C)):
CollectInternalGen(C)
'rule' CollectInternalInt(if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q)):
CollectInternalVariable(P)
CollectInternalVariable(Q)

/*------------------------------COLLECT INTERNAL VARIABLES GENERAL ACTIONS------------------------------------------*/
'action' CollectInternalGen(C:GEN_ACT)
'rule' CollectInternalGen(genexact(C)):
CollectInternalExt(C)
'rule' CollectInternalGen(genincomp(C)):
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CollectInternalInt(C)
'rule' CollectInternalGen(dotgenact(C,D)):
CollectInternalGen(C)
CollectInternalGen(D)

/*------------------------------COLLECT CONTROLLED VARIABLES--------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' CollectControlledVariable(P: PROCESS)
'rule' CollectControlledVariable(zero)
'rule' CollectControlledVariable(dotext(E,P)):
CollectControlledExt(E)
CollectControlledVariable(P)
'rule' CollectControlledVariable(dotint(C,P)):
CollectControlledInt(C)
CollectControlledVariable(P)
'rule' CollectControlledVariable(parproc(P,Q)):
CollectControlledVariable(P)
CollectControlledVariable(Q)

/*-------------------------------COLLECT CONTROLLED VARIABLES EXTERNAL ACTIONS--------------------------------------*/
'action' CollectControlledExt(E: EXT_ACT)
'rule' CollectControlledExt(comm(bracket(C,V)))
'rule' CollectControlledExt(comm(angle(C,V))):
(|checkdeclaredvariable(C)
PrintChannel(C)
declaredvariable -> L
declaredvariable <- chanlist(C,L)
|| |)
'rule' CollectControlledExt(comm(send(C,U))):
(|checkdeclaredvariable(C)
PrintChannel(C)
declaredvariable -> L
declaredvariable <- chanlist(C,L)
|| |)
'rule' CollectControlledExt(comm(send1(C,U))):
(|checkdeclaredvariable(C)
PrintChannel(C)
declaredvariable -> L
declaredvariable <- chanlist(C,L)
|| |)

/*-------------------------------COLLECT CONTROLLED VARIABLE INTERNAL COMPUTATIONS----------------------------------*/
'action' CollectControlledInt(C:INT_COMP)
'rule' CollectControlledInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),C)):
CollectControlledGen(C)
'rule' CollectControlledInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),C)):
CollectControlledGen(C)
'rule' CollectControlledInt(if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q)):
CollectControlledVariable(P)
CollectControlledVariable(Q)

/*-------------------------------COLLECT CONTROLLED VARIABLE GENERAL ACTIONS----------------------------------------*/
'action' CollectControlledGen(C:GEN_ACT)
'rule' CollectControlledGen(genexact(C)):
CollectControlledExt(C)
'rule' CollectControlledGen(genincomp(C)):
CollectControlledInt(C)
'rule' CollectControlledGen(dotgenact(C,D)):
CollectControlledGen(C)
CollectControlledGen(D)

/*-------------------------------TRANSLATE EXTERNAL ACTION----------------------------------------------------------*/

77

'action' TranslateExt(E: EXT_ACT, P:PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateExt(comm(bracket(C,V)),P):
Nl InsertVar(V)
InsertatC(C)
PrintVarEq(V,C)
Nl Put("};")
'rule' TranslateExt(comm(angle(C,V)),P):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<-lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintVarChanEq(C,V)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl Put("};")
|| |)
'rule' TranslateExt(comm(send(C,U)),P):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintChanConstantEq(C,U)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl Put("};")
|| |)
'rule' TranslateExt(comm(send1(C,U)),P):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintChanIntEq(C,U)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl Put("};")
|| |)

/*-----------------------------PRINT ALL DEFINITIONS FROM REST--------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C: CHANNEL,P:PROCESS)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)),zero)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)), dotext(E,P)):
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt(var(T,X),E,P)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)),P)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)), dotint(C1,P)):
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X),C1,P)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)), parproc(P,Q))

/*----------------------------PRINT ALL DEFINITIONS FROM REST EXTERNAL ACTIONS-----------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt(C:VAR, E:EXT_ACT,P:PROCESS)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt(var(T,X),comm(bracket(C,V)),P)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt(var(T1,X1),comm(angle(channel(var(T,X)),V)),P):
(|eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
InsertatCV(V)
PrintvariableNoType(V)
Put("}")
|| |)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt(var(T,X),comm(send(channel(var(T1,X1)),U)),P):
(|eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
Insertattrue(channel(var(T1,X1)))
id_to_string(U->U1)
Put("\"")
Put(U1)
Put("\"")
Nl Put("}")
|| |)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt(var(T,X),comm(send1(channel(var(T1,X1)),U)),P):
(|eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
Insertattrue(channel(var(T1,X1)))
PutI(U)
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Nl Put("}")
|| |)

/*----------------------------PRINT ALL DEFINITIONS FROM REST EXT IF----------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtIf(C:VAR, E:EXT_ACT,P:PROCESS)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtIf(var(T,X),comm(bracket(C,V)),P)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtIf(var(T1,X1),comm(angle(channel(var(T,X)),V)),P):
(|eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
VarConsList->L
ne(L,nil)
countifinner<-1
countif<-1
InsertatCV(V)
PrintvariableNoType(V)
Put("}")
|| eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
countifinner<-1
countif<-1
InsertatCV(V)
PrintvariableNoType(V)
Put("}")
|| |)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtIf(var(T,X),comm(send(channel(var(T1,X1)),U)),P):
(|eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
VarConsList->L
ne(L,nil)
countifinner<-1
countif<-1
Insertattrue(channel(var(T1,X1)))
id_to_string(U->U1)
Put("\"")
Put(U1)
Put("\"")
Nl Put("}")
|| eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
countifinner<-1
countif<-1
Insertattrue(channel(var(T1,X1)))
id_to_string(U->U1)
Put(U1)
Nl Put("}")
|| |)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtIf(var(T,X),comm(send1(channel(var(T1,X1)),U)),P):
(|eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
VarConsList->L
ne(L,nil)
countifinner<-1
countif<-1
Insertattrue(channel(var(T1,X1)))
PutI(U)
Nl Put("}")
|| eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
countifinner<-1
countif<-1
Insertattrue(channel(var(T1,X1)))
PutI(U)
Nl Put("}")
|| |)

/*-----------------------------------PRINT ALL DEFINITIONS FROM REST EXT OTHERWISE---------------------------------*/
'action' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtOtherwise(C:VAR, E:EXT_ACT,P:PROCESS)
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'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtOtherwise(var(T,X),comm(bracket(C,V)),P)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtOtherwise(var(T1,X1),comm(angle(channel(var(T,X)),V)),P):
(|eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
InsertatCV(V)
PrintvariableNoType(V)
Put("}")
|| |)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtOtherwise(var(T,X),comm(send(channel(var(T1,X1)),U)),P):
(|eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
Insertattrue(channel(var(T1,X1)))
id_to_string(U->U1)
Put("\"")
Put(U1)
Put("\"")
Nl Put("}")
|| |)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtOtherwise(var(T,X),comm(send1(channel(var(T1,X1)),U)),P):
(|eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
Insertattrue(channel(var(T1,X1)))
PutI(U)
Nl Put("}")
|| |)

/*----------------------------PRINT ALL DEFINITIONS FROM REST INTERNAL COMPUTATIONS-------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(C:VAR, I:INT_COMP,P:PROCESS)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X),
let_instantiate(var(type(T1),X1),method(T2,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genincomp(C)),P):
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X),C,P)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)),P)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X),
let_instantiate(var(type(T1),X1),method(T2,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genexact(C)),P):
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt(var(T,X),C,P)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)),P)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X), let_instantiate(var(type(T1),X1),method(T2,I,J,nil),genincomp(C)),P):
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X),C,P)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)),P)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X), let_instantiate(var(type(T1),X1),method(T2,I,J,nil),genexact(C)),P):
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt(var(T,X),C,P)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)),P)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X), if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q),P1):
countifinner<- 0
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestif(var(T,X),cons(Cons),P)
Nl PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestOtherwise(var(T,X),cons(Cons),P,Q)
Nl

/*---------------------------PRINT ALL DEFINITIONS FROM REST IF STATEMENT-----------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestif(C:VAR, B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP, P:PROCESS)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestif(var(T,X),cons(Cons), zero)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestif(var(T,X),cons(Cons), dotext(E,P)):
(|ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),dotext(E,P))
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
VarConsList->L
ifc->M1
PushConstraintIfVar(cons(Cons),L)
ifc->M
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtIf(var(T,X),E,P)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)),P)|| |)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestif(var(T,X),cons(Cons), dotint(C,P)):
(|ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),dotint(C,P))
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
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Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
VarConsList->L
PushConstraintIfVar(cons(Cons),L)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X),C,P) || |)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestif(var(T,X),cons(Cons), parproc(P,Q))

/*--------------------------PRINT ALL DEFINITIONS FROM REST OTHERWISE---------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestOtherwise(C:VAR, B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP, Q: PROCESS, P:PROCESS)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestOtherwise(var(T,X),cons(Cons),P, zero):
Nl (|ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),P)
Put("}")|||)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestOtherwise(var(T,X),cons(Cons),Q, dotext(E,P)):
Nl (| eq(Q,zero)
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),dotext(E,P))
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtOtherwise(var(T,X),E,P)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)),P)
Put("}")
|| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),Q)
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),dotext(E,P))
Put("otherwise ->")
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtOtherwise(var(T,X),E,P)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)),P)
Put("}")
|| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),dotext(E,P))
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExtOtherwise(var(T,X),E,P)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(var(T,X)),P)
Put("}")
|| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),Q) Put("}")
|| |)
VarConsList->L
PushConstraintOtherwiseVar(cons(Cons),L)
'rule' PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestOtherwise(var(T,X),cons(Cons),Q, dotint(C,P)):
Nl (| eq(Q,zero)
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),dotint(C,P))
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("otherwise ->")
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X),C,P)
Put("}")
|| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),Q)
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),dotint(C,P))
Put("otherwise ->")
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X),C,P)
Put("}")
|| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),dotint(C,P))
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("otherwise ->")
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(var(T,X),C,P)
Put("}")
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|| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(var(T,X),Q)
Put("}") |)
VarConsList->L
PushConstraintOtherwiseVar(cons(Cons),L)

/*-------------------------INSERT VARIABLE------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' InsertVar(V: VAR)
'rule' InsertVar(var(type(T),X)):
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(X1)
Put("=")
Put(" initially")
id_to_string(T->T1)
(| eq(T1,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T1,"real")
Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then ")
Nl

/*-------------------------INSERT @C-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' InsertatC(C: CHANNEL)
'rule' InsertatC(channel(var(type(T),X))):
Nl (| id_to_string(T->T1)
ne(T1,"aldef")
Put("if {")
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("@C(")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(X1)
Put(")")
Put(" ")
Put("->")
Nl ||
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("\"true\"")
Put(" ")
Put("->")
Nl |)

/*----------------------------------INSERT @C VARIABLE-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' InsertatCV(C: VAR)
'rule' InsertatCV(var(type(T),X)):
(| id_to_string(T->T1)
ne(T1,"aldef")
Nl Put("if {")
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("@C(")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(X1)
Put(")")
Put(" ")
Put("->")
Nl || Put("if {")
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("\"true\"")
Put(" ")
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Put("->")
Nl |)

/*------------------------INSERT @T-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' Insertattrue(C:CHANNEL)
'rule' Insertattrue(channel(var(T,X))):
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[] \"true\" ->")

/*-----------------------------------PRINT VAR EQ----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintVarEq(V: VAR,C: CHANNEL)
'rule' PrintVarEq(var(type(T),X),channel(var(type(T1),Y))):
id_to_string(Y->Y1)
Put(" ")
Put(Y1)
Nl

/*----------------------------------PRINT VAR CHAN EQ-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintVarChanEq(C: CHANNEL,V: VAR)
'rule' PrintVarChanEq(channel(var(type(T1),Y)),var(type(T),X)):
Nl id_to_string(X->X1)
id_to_string(Y->Y1)
Put(Y1)
Put("= initially")
id_to_string(T1->T2)
(| eq(T2,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T2,"real")
Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then if{")
Nl (| id_to_string(T->T3)
ne(T3,"aldef")
Put("[]")
Put("@C(")
Put(X1)
Put(") ->")
Put(X1)
Nl ||
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("\"true\"")
Put(" ")
Put("->")
Put(X1)
Nl |)

/*--------------------------------------PRINT VAR CHAN EQ OTHERWISE-----------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintVarChanEqOtherwise(C: CHANNEL,V: VAR,D: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' PrintVarChanEqOtherwise(channel(var(type(T1),Y)),var(type(T),X), cons(Cons)):
Nl id_to_string(X->X1)
id_to_string(Y->Y1)
Put(Y1)
Put("= initially")
id_to_string(T1->T2)
(| eq(T2,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T2,"real")
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Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then if{")
Nl (| ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
explorestackif || |)
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise -> if{")
Nl (| id_to_string(T->T3)
ne(T3,"aldef")
Put("[] @C(")
Put(X1)
Put(") ->")
Put(X1)
Put("")
Nl Put("}")
Nl ||
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("\"true\"")
Put(" ")
Put("->")
Put(X1)
Put("}")
Nl |)

/*---------------------------------PRINT CHAN CONSTANT EQ----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintChanConstantEq(C: CHANNEL,U: IDENT)
'rule' PrintChanConstantEq(channel(var(type(T1),Y)),U):
id_to_string(U->X1)
id_to_string(Y->Y1)
Nl Put(Y1)
Put("= initially")
id_to_string(T1->T2)
(| eq(T2,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T2,"real")
Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then if{")
Nl (| ifc->L
ne(L,nil)
explorestackif Nl
Put("[] \"true\" ->")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"") Nl
|| Nl Put("[] \"true\" ->")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Nl |)

/*---------------------------------PRINT CHAN CONSTANT EQ OTHERWISE------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintChanConstantEqOtherwise(C: CHANNEL,U: IDENT, D: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' PrintChanConstantEqOtherwise(channel(var(type(T1),Y)),U, cons(Cons)):
id_to_string(U->X1)
id_to_string(Y->Y1)
Nl Put(Y1)
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Put("= initially")
id_to_string(T1->T2)
(| eq(T2,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T2,"real")
Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then if{")
Nl (| ifc->L
ne(L,nil)
explorestackif Nl
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("}")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[] \"true\" ->")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Nl Put("}")
Nl ||
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Nl
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[] \"true\" ->")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Nl Put("}")
Nl |)

/*----------------------------------PRINT CHAN INT EQ--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintChanIntEq(C: CHANNEL,U: INT)
'rule' PrintChanIntEq(channel(var(type(T1),Y)),U):
id_to_string(Y->Y1)
Nl Put(Y1)
Put("= initially")
id_to_string(T1->T2)
(| eq(T2,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T2,"real")
Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then if{")
Nl Put("[] \"true\" -> ")
PutI(U)
Nl

/*----------------------------------PRINT CHAN INT EQ OTHERWISE---------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintChanIntEqOtherwise(C: CHANNEL,U: INT, B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' PrintChanIntEqOtherwise(channel(var(type(T1),Y)),U, cons(Cons)):
id_to_string(Y->Y1)
Nl Put(Y1)
Put("= initially")
id_to_string(T1->T2)
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(| eq(T2,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T2,"real")
Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then if{")
Nl (| ifc->L
ne(L,nil)
explorestackif
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("}")
Nl Put("otherwise -> if{")
Nl Put("[] \"true\" -> ")
PutI(U)
Nl Put("}")
Nl
|| Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("}")
Nl Put("otherwise -> if{")
Nl Put("[] \"true\" -> ")
PutI(U)
Nl Put("}")
Nl |)

/*--------------------------------PRINT CHAN CONSTANT EQ IF-------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintChanConstantEqif(C: CHANNEL,U: IDENT,B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' PrintChanConstantEqif(channel(var(type(T1),Y)),U,cons(Cons)):
id_to_string(U->X1)
id_to_string(Y->Y1)
Nl Put(Y1)
Put("= initially")
id_to_string(T1->T2)
(| eq(T2,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T2,"real")
Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then if{")
Nl
Nl (| ifc->L
ne(L,nil)
explorestackif
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[] \"true\" ->")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("}")
Nl
|| Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
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Put("if{")
Nl Put("[] \"true\" ->")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("}")
Nl |)

/*---------------------------------PRINT CHAN INT EQ IF-----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintChanIntEqif(C: CHANNEL,U: INT, B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' PrintChanIntEqif(channel(var(type(T1),Y)),U, cons(Cons)):
id_to_string(Y->Y1)
Nl Put(Y1)
Put("= initially")
id_to_string(T1->T2)
(| eq(T2,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T2,"real")
Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then if{")
Nl (| ifc->L
ne(L,nil)
explorestackif
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") ->")
Nl PutI(U)
Nl
|| Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") ->")
Nl PutI(U)
Nl |)

/*----------------------------------PRINT VAN CHAN EQ IF----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintVarChanEqif(C: CHANNEL,V: VAR,B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' PrintVarChanEqif(channel(var(type(T1),Y)),var(type(T),X),cons(Cons)):
Nl id_to_string(X->X1)
id_to_string(Y->Y1)
Put(Y1)
Put("= initially")
id_to_string(T1->T2)
(| eq(T2,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T2,"real")
Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then if{")
Nl (| ifc->L
ne(L,nil)
explorestackif
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") ->")
Put("if{")
Nl (| id_to_string(T->T3)
ne(T3,"aldef")
Put("[]")
Put("@C(")
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Put(X1)
Put(") ->")
Put(X1)
Nl Put("}")
Nl ||
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("\"true\"")
Put(" ")
Put("->")
Put(X1)
Put("}")
Nl |)
|| Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") ->")
Put("if{")
Nl (| id_to_string(T->T3)
ne(T3,"aldef")
Put("[]")
Put("@C(")
Put(X1)
Put(") ->")
Put(X1)
Put("}")
Nl ||
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("\"true\"")
Put(" ")
Put("->")
Put(X1)
Put("}")
Nl |) |)

/*--------------------------------------PRINT CHANNEL-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintC(C: CHANNEL)
'rule' PrintC(channel(var(T,X))):
id_to_string(X->X1) Put(X1)

/*------------------------------------@C VARIABLE LIST-----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' atCvarlist(V: VARLIST)
'rule' atCvarlist(nil):
Put(" -> ")
'rule' atCvarlist(varlist(var(type(T),X),L)):
(|id_to_string(T->T1)
ne(T1,"aldef")
Put("@C(")
PrintvariableNoType(var(type(T),X))
Put(")")
(|ne(L,nil)
ContainsPrintableType(L)
Put(" & ")
|| |)
|| |)
atCvarlist(L)

/*---------------------------------PRINT REST SERVICE CALLS-------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintRestServiceCalls(C:INT_COMP,P:PROCESS)
'rule' PrintRestServiceCalls(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genincomp(C)),P):
Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
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Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
'rule' PrintRestServiceCalls(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genexact(C)),P):
Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl
PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
'rule' PrintRestServiceCalls(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genincomp(C)),P):
Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(" \"true\" -> ")
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
'rule' PrintRestServiceCalls(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genexact(C)),P):
Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(" \"true\" -> ")
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl
PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
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'rule' PrintRestServiceCalls(if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q),P1):
PrintAllServicesFromRestIf(cons(Cons),P)
PrintAllServicesFromRestOtherwise(cons(Cons),P,Q)
Nl
/*---------------------------------------PRINT ALL SERVICES FROM REST-----------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintAllServicesFromRest(P:PROCESS)
'rule' PrintAllServicesFromRest(zero)
'rule' PrintAllServicesFromRest(dotext(E,P)):
PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
'rule' PrintAllServicesFromRest(dotint(C1,P)):
PrintRestServiceCalls(C1,P)

/*------------------------------------------PRINT ALL SERVICES FROM REST IF----------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintAllServicesFromRestIf(C:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP, P: PROCESS)
'rule' PrintAllServicesFromRestIf(cons(Cons),zero)
'rule' PrintAllServicesFromRestIf(cons(Cons),dotext(E,P)):
(| ContainsServices(dotext(E,P))
Put("[] \"true\" ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("if{")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(dotext(E,P))
Put("}")
|| |)
'rule' PrintAllServicesFromRestIf(cons(Cons),dotint(C,P)):
(|ContainsServices(dotint(C,P))
Put("[] \"true\" ->")
Put("if{")
Nl
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("if{")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(dotint(C,P))
Put("}")|| |)

/*-----------------------------------------PRINT ALL SERVICES FROM REST OTHERWISE-----------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintAllServicesFromRestOtherwise(C:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP, P: PROCESS,Q: PROCESS)
'rule' PrintAllServicesFromRestOtherwise(cons(Cons),Q,zero): Nl (|ContainsServices(Q) Put("}") || |)
'rule' PrintAllServicesFromRestOtherwise(cons(Cons),Q,dotext(E,P)):
Nl (|eq(Q,zero)
ContainsServices(dotext(E,P))
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(dotext(E,P))
Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
|| ContainsServices(Q)
ContainsServices(dotext(E,P))
Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(dotext(E,P))
Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
|| ContainsServices(dotext(E,P))
Put("[] \"true\" ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
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Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(dotext(E,P))
Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
|| ContainsServices(Q)
Put("}") || |)
'rule' PrintAllServicesFromRestOtherwise(cons(Cons),Q,dotint(C,P)):
Nl (|eq(Q,zero)
ContainsServices(dotint(C,P))
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(dotint(C,P))
Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
|| ContainsServices(Q)
ContainsServices(dotint(C,P))
Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(dotint(C,P))
Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
|| ContainsServices(dotint(C,P))
Put("[] \"true\" ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(dotint(C,P))
Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
|| ContainsServices(Q)
Put("}") || |)

/*-------------------------------PUSH CONSTRAINT OTHERWISE--------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PushConstraintOtherwise(B: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP, L: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST)
'rule' PushConstraintOtherwise(cons(Cons),nil):
ifc<-conlist(nil,intpair(cons(Cons),1))
'rule' PushConstraintOtherwise(cons(Cons),conlist(U,V)):
PushConstraintOtherwise(cons(Cons),U)
ifc->L
ifc <- conlist(L,V)

/*---------------------------------PUSH CONSTRAINT OTHERWISE VARIABLE--------------------------------------------*/

'action' PushConstraintOtherwiseVar(B: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP, L: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST)
'rule' PushConstraintOtherwiseVar(cons(Cons),nil):
VarConsList<-conlist(nil,intpair(cons(Cons),1))
'rule' PushConstraintOtherwiseVar(cons(Cons),conlist(U,V)):
PushConstraintOtherwiseVar(cons(Cons),U)
VarConsList->L
VarConsList<- conlist(L,V)

/*------------------------------------PUSH CONSTRAINT OTHERWISE SERVICE---------------------------------------------*/
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'action' PushConstraintOtherwiseServ(B: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP, L: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST)
'rule' PushConstraintOtherwiseServ(cons(Cons),nil):
ServConsList<-conlist(nil,intpair(cons(Cons),1))
'rule' PushConstraintOtherwiseServ(cons(Cons),conlist(U,V)):
PushConstraintOtherwiseServ(cons(Cons),U)
ServConsList->L
ServConsList<- conlist(L,V)

/*-------------------------------PUSH CONSTRAINT IF---------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PushConstraintIf(B: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP, L: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST)
'rule' PushConstraintIf(cons(Cons),nil):
ifc<-conlist(nil,intpair(cons(Cons),0))
'rule' PushConstraintIf(cons(Cons),conlist(U,V)):
PushConstraintIf(cons(Cons),U)
ifc->L
ifc <- conlist(L,V)

/*---------------------------------------PUSH CONSTRAINT IF VARIABLE---------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PushConstraintIfVar(B: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP, L: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST)
'rule' PushConstraintIfVar(cons(Cons),nil):
VarConsList<-conlist(nil,intpair(cons(Cons),0))
'rule' PushConstraintIfVar(cons(Cons),conlist(U,V)):
VarConsList ->L
VarConsList <- conlist(L,V)

/*------------------------------------PUSH CONSTRAINT IF SERVICE----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PushConstraintIfServ(B: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP, L: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP_LIST)
'rule' PushConstraintIfServ(cons(Cons),nil):
ServConsList<-conlist(nil,intpair(cons(Cons),0))
'rule' PushConstraintIfServ(cons(Cons),conlist(U,V)):
ServConsList ->L
ServConsList <- conlist(L,V)

/*------------------------------------------CLOSE BRACKETS-------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' CloseBrackets
'rule' CloseBrackets:
(|newstack-> N
ifzero(N)
|| Nl Put("}")
Nl newstack -> N
newstack <- N-1
CloseBrackets |)

/*----------------------------------CLOSE BRACKETS VARIABLE--------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' CloseBracketsVar
'rule' CloseBracketsVar:
(|newstackvar-> N
ifzero(N)
|| Nl Put("}")
Nl newstackvar -> N
newstackvar <- N-1
CloseBracketsVar |)

/*---------------------------------------CLOSE BRACKETS SERVICE----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' CloseBracketsServ
'rule' CloseBracketsServ:
(|newstackserv-> N
ifzero(N)
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|| Nl Put("}")
Nl newstackserv -> N
newstackserv <- N-1
CloseBracketsServ |)

/*------------------------------------------------INSERT VAR IF---------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' InsertVarIf(V: VAR)
'rule' InsertVarIf(var(type(T),X)):
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(X1)
Put("= initially")
id_to_string(T->T1)
(| eq(T1,"integer")
Put(" ")
PutI(0)
Put(" ")
|| eq(T1,"real")
Put("0.0")
|| Put(" ")
Put("null")
Put(" ") |)
Put(" then ")
Nl

/*---------------------------------------INSERT AT C IF-----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' InsertatCif(C: CHANNEL,B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' InsertatCif(channel(var(type(T),X)),cons(Cons)):
Nl Put("if {")
Nl (| ifc->L
ne(L,nil)
explorestackif
Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")->")
Put(" ")
Put("if{")
Nl(| id_to_string(T->T3)
ne(T3,"aldef")
Put("[]")
Put("@C(")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(X1)
Put(")")
Put(" ")
Put("->")
Nl ||
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("\"true\"")
Put(" ")
Put("->")
Nl |)
|| Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")->")
Put(" ")
Put("if{")
Nl(| id_to_string(T->T3)
ne(T3,"aldef")
Put("[]")
Put("@C(")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(X1)
Put(")")
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Put(" ")
Put("->") Nl
|| Nl Put("[]")
Put(" ")
Put("\"true\"")
Put(" ")
Put("->")
Nl |)|)

/*---------------------------------------EXPLORE STACK IF---------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' explorestackif
'rule' explorestackif:
ifc->L
ifc1<-L
explorestackifnext

/*--------------------------------------------EXPLORE STACK IF NEXT-------------------------------------------------------*/

'action' explorestackifnext
'rule' explorestackifnext:
ifc1->conlist(U,intpair(cons(Cons),B))
(|eq(B,0)
ne(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Put("if{")
newstack-> N
newstack <- N+1
Nl ifc1<-U
explorestackifnext
Nl || eq(B,0)
eq(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Put("if{")
newstack-> N
newstack <- N+1 Nl
|| eq(B,1)
ne(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise -> ")
Put("if{")
newstack-> N
newstack <- N+1
Nl ifc1<-U
explorestackifnext
Nl || eq(B,1)
eq(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise -> ")
Put("if{")
newstack-> N
newstack <- N+1
Nl |)

/*---------------------------------------EXPLORE STACK IF VARIABLE-----------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' explorestackifVar
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'rule' explorestackifVar:
VarConsList->conlist(U,intpair(cons(Cons),B))
(|eq(B,0)
ne(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Put("if{")
newstackvar-> N
newstackvar <- N+1
Nl explorestackifVar Nl
|| eq(B,0)
eq(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Put("if{")
newstackvar-> N
newstackvar <- N+1
Nl
|| eq(B,1)
ne(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise -> ")
Put("if{")
newstackvar-> N
newstackvar <- N+1
Nl explorestackifVar
Nl || eq(B,1)
eq(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise -> ")
Put("if{")
newstackvar-> N
newstackvar <- N+1
Nl |)

/*-----------------------------------------------------EXPLORE STACK IF SERVICE-----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' explorestackifServ
'rule' explorestackifServ:
ServConsList->conlist(U,intpair(cons(Cons),B))
(|eq(B,0)
ne(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Put("if{")
newstackserv-> N
newstackserv <- N+1
Nl explorestackifServ
Nl
|| eq(B,0)
eq(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Put("if{")
newstackserv-> N
newstackserv <- N+1 Nl
|| eq(B,1)
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ne(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise -> ")
Put("if{")
newstackserv-> N
newstackserv <- N+1
Nl explorestackifServ
Nl || eq(B,1)
eq(U,nil)
Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise -> ")
Put("if{")
newstackserv-> N
newstackserv <- N+1
Nl |)

/*----------------------------------------TRANSLATE INT-----------------------------------------------------------------*/

'action' TranslateInt(C: INT_COMP, P:PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genincomp(C)),P):
(|service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Nl Put("};")
TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P)
|| TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P)|)
'rule' TranslateInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genexact(C)),P):
(|service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
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Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
Put("};")
Nl TranslateGen(genexact(C),P)
|| TranslateGen(genexact(C),P)|)
'rule' TranslateInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genincomp(C)),P):
(|service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(" \"true\" ->")
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Nl Put("};")
TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P)
|| TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P)|)
'rule' TranslateInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genexact(C)),P):
(|service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(" \"true\" ->")
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
Put("};")
Nl TranslateGen(genexact(C),P)
|| TranslateGen(genexact(C),P)|)
'rule' TranslateInt(if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q),P1):
TranslateProcessIf(P,Q,cons(Cons))

/*--------------------------------------TRANSLATE PROCESS IF-------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateProcessIf(P: PROCESS, Q: PROCESS, B: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' TranslateProcessIf(zero,zero,cons(Cons))
'rule' TranslateProcessIf(zero,Q,cons(Cons)):
TranslateOtherwiseProcess(Q,cons(Cons))
'rule' TranslateProcessIf(P,zero,cons(Cons)):
TranslateifModuleProcess(P,cons(Cons))
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'rule' TranslateProcessIf(dotext(E,P),Q,cons(Cons)):
TranslateExtIf(E,P,cons(Cons),Q)
TranslateProcessIf(P,Q,cons(Cons))
(| IsStack(0)
Put("")
|| Put("}")
stack->N
stack<-N-1 |)
'rule' TranslateProcessIf(dotint(C,P),Q,cons(Cons)):
TranslateIntIf(C,P,cons(Cons),Q)
TranslateProcessIf(P,Q,cons(Cons))

/*------------------------------------TRANSLATE OTHERWISE PROCESS-------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateOtherwiseProcess(Q: PROCESS, B: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseProcess(zero,cons(Cons))
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseProcess(dotext(E,P),cons(Cons)):
TranslateExtOtherwiseModule(E,P,cons(Cons))
TranslateOtherwiseProcess(P,cons(Cons))
(| IsStack(0)
|| Put("}")
stack->N
stack<-N-1 |)
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseProcess(dotint(C,P),cons(Cons)):
TranslateIntOtherwiseModule(C,P,cons(Cons))

/*-----------------------------------TRANSLATE EXT OTHERWISE MODULE-----------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateExtOtherwiseModule(E: EXT_ACT, P:PROCESS, B: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' TranslateExtOtherwiseModule(comm(bracket(C,V)), P, cons(Cons)):
Nl InsertVar(V)
Put("if{") Nl
(| ifc->L
ne(L,nil)
explorestackif
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" @C(")
PrintC(C)Put(") -> ")
Nl PrintVarEq(V,C)
Put("")
Put("")
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put("}")
Put(";")
Nl
|| Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" @C(")
PrintC(C)
Put(") -> ")
Nl
PrintVarEq(V,C)
Put(" ")
Put("")
Nl Put("}")
Nl Put("};")
Nl |)
'rule' TranslateExtOtherwiseModule(comm(angle(C,V)), P, cons(Cons)):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
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checkl<-lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintVarChanEqOtherwise(C,V,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets Put(";")
|| |)
'rule' TranslateExtOtherwiseModule(comm(send(C,U)), P, cons(Cons)):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
explorestackif
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintChanConstantEqOtherwise(C,U,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets Put(";")
|| ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintChanConstantEqOtherwise(C,U,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";") || |)
'rule' TranslateExtOtherwiseModule(comm(send1(C,U)), P, cons(Cons)):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
explorestackif
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintChanIntEqOtherwise(C,U,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
|| ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintChanIntEqOtherwise(C,U,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")|| |)

/*--------------------------------TRANSLATE INT OTHERWISE MODULE---------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateIntOtherwiseModule(C: INT_COMP, P: PROCESS, B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' TranslateIntOtherwiseModule(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genincomp(C)), P,
cons(Cons)):
(|service->M
ifzero(M)
ifc->L1 ne(L1,nil)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl explorestackif
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(X->X1)
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
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Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
ifc->L2
PushConstraintOtherwise(cons(Cons),L2)
TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P)
|| service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(X->X1)
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets Put(";")
ifc->L2
PushConstraintOtherwise(cons(Cons),L2)
TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P)
|| ifc->L2
PushConstraintOtherwise(cons(Cons),L2)
TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P)|)
'rule' TranslateIntOtherwiseModule(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genexact(C)), P, cons(Cons)):
(|service->M ifzero(M)
ifc->L1 ne(L1,nil)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl explorestackif
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(X->X1)
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
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Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("") Nl
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
Nl Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
TranslateGenConsOth(genexact(C),zero,cons(Cons),P)
|| service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") -> ")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(X->X1)
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
Nl Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
ifc->L2
TranslateGenConsOth(genexact(C),zero,cons(Cons),P)
|| ifc->L2
TranslateGenConsOth(genexact(C),zero,cons(Cons),P)
|)
'rule' TranslateIntOtherwiseModule(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genincomp(C)), P, cons(Cons)):
(|service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl explorestackif
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") ->")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" \"true\" ")
id_to_string(X->X1)
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id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P)
|| service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") ->")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" \"true\" ")
id_to_string(X->X1)
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
ifc->L2
PushConstraintOtherwise(cons(Cons),L2)
TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P)
|| ifc->L2
PushConstraintOtherwise(cons(Cons),L2)
TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P)|)
'rule' TranslateIntOtherwiseModule(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genexact(C)), P, cons(Cons)):
(|service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl explorestackif
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") ->")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" \"true\" ")
id_to_string(X->X1)
id_to_string(I->I1)
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id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
TranslateGenConsOth(genexact(C),zero,cons(Cons),P)
|| service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl
Nl Put("[] @T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(") ->")
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put(" \"true\" ")
id_to_string(X->X1)
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
Nl Put("}")
CloseBrackets Put(";")
ifc->L2
TranslateGenConsOth(genexact(C),zero,cons(Cons),P)
|| ifc->L2
TranslateGenConsOth(genexact(C),zero,cons(Cons),P) |)
'rule' TranslateIntOtherwiseModule(if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q), P1, cons(Cons1)):
ifc->L
PushConstraintOtherwise(cons(Cons1),L)
TranslateProcessIf(P,Q,cons(Cons))

/*------------------------------------TRANSLATE IF MODULE PROCESS--------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateifModuleProcess(P:PROCESS, B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP)
'rule' TranslateifModuleProcess(zero,cons(Cons))
'rule' TranslateifModuleProcess(dotext(E,P),cons(Cons)):
TranslateExtIf(E,P,cons(Cons),zero)
TranslateifModuleProcess(P,cons(Cons))
'rule' TranslateifModuleProcess(dotint(C,P),cons(Cons)):
TranslateIntIf(C,P,cons(Cons),zero)
/*----------------------------------TRANSLATE EXT IF-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateExtIf(E: EXT_ACT, P:PROCESS, B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP,Q:PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateExtIf(comm(bracket(C,V)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
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Nl InsertVarIf(V)
InsertatCif(C,cons(Cons))
PrintVarEq(V,C)
Put("}")
Nl
Put("}") Nl
CloseBrackets Put(";")
Nl
Nl
'rule' TranslateExtIf(comm(angle(C,V)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintVarChanEqif(C,V,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl (| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh(C,Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateExtOtherwise(C,Q)|| |)
Nl CloseBrackets
Put("}")
Put(";")
Nl
Nl || |)
'rule' TranslateExtIf(comm(send(C,U)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintChanConstantEqif(C,U,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl (| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh(C,Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateExtOtherwise(C,Q) || |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
Nl
Nl || |)
'rule' TranslateExtIf(comm(send1(C,U)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintChanIntEqif(C,U,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl (| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh(C,Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateExtOtherwise(C,Q) || |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
Nl
Nl || |)

/*--------------------------------------------------------------TRANSLATE EXTERNAL OTHERWISE-----------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateExtOth(E: EXT_ACT, P:PROCESS, B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP,Q:PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateExtOth(comm(bracket(C,V)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
Nl InsertVarIf(V)
InsertatCif(C,cons(Cons))
PrintVarEq(V,C)
Put("}")
Nl Put("}")
Nl CloseBrackets
Put(";")
Nl
Nl
'rule' TranslateExtOth(comm(angle(C,V)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintVarChanEqif(C,V,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
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Nl (| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh(C,Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateExtOtherwise(C,Q)|| |)
Put("}")
Nl
CloseBrackets
Put("}")
Put(";")
Nl
Nl || |)
'rule' TranslateExtOth(comm(send(C,U)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintChanConstantEqif(C,U,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl (| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh(C,Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateExtOtherwise(C,Q) || |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
Nl
Nl || |)
'rule' TranslateExtOth(comm(send1(C,U)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
(|ChecknotVar(C)
checkl->L
checkl<- lst(varpair(C,1),L)
PrintChanIntEqif(C,U,cons(Cons))
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(C,P)
Nl (| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh(C,Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateExtOtherwise(C,Q) || |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
Nl
Nl || |)

/*-------------------------------TRANSLATE EXT OTHERWISE----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateExtOtherwise(C:CHANNEL,Q:PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateExtOtherwise(C,zero)
'rule' TranslateExtOtherwise(channel(C),dotext(E,P)):
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestExt(C,E,P)
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRest(channel(C),P)
'rule' TranslateExtOtherwise(channel(C),dotint(I,P)):
PrintAllDefinitionsfromRestInt(C,I,P)

/*---------------------------------TRANSLATE INT IF---------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateIntIf(C: INT_COMP, P:PROCESS, B: BOOLEAN_INT_COMP,Q:PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateIntIf(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genincomp(C)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
(|service->M
ifzero(M)
ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl explorestackif
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
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Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
(|ContainsServices(Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateOtherwiseInt(Q)|||)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets Put(";")
TranslateGenCons(genincomp(C),P,cons(Cons),Q)
|| service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Nl Put("}")
(| ContainsServices(Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateOtherwiseInt(Q)|| |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets Put(";")
TranslateGenCons(genincomp(C),P,cons(Cons),Q)
|| TranslateGenCons(genincomp(C),P,cons(Cons),Q)|)
'rule' TranslateIntIf(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genexact(C)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
(|service->M
ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl explorestackif
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
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atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl Put("}")
PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
(|ContainsServices(Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateOtherwiseInt(Q)|| |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
TranslateGenCons(genexact(C),P,cons(Cons),Q)
|| service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl Put("}")
PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
(|ContainsServices(Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateOtherwiseInt(Q)|| |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
TranslateGenCons(genexact(C),P,cons(Cons),Q)
|| TranslateGenCons(genexact(C),P,cons(Cons),Q) |)
'rule' TranslateIntIf(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genincomp(C)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
(|service->M
ifzero(M)
ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl explorestackif
Nl Put("[]")
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Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(" \"true\" ->")
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Put("}")
Nl (|ContainsServices(Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateOtherwiseInt(Q)|| |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
TranslateGenCons(genincomp(C),P,cons(Cons),Q)
|| service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(" \"true\" ->")
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Put("}")
Nl (|ContainsServices(Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateOtherwiseInt(Q)|| |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
TranslateGenCons(genincomp(C),P,cons(Cons),Q)
|| TranslateGenCons(genincomp(C),P,cons(Cons),Q) |)
'rule' TranslateIntIf(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genexact(C)),P,cons(Cons),Q):
(|service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
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Nl explorestackif
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(" \"true\" ->")
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl Put("}")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
Nl (|ContainsServices(Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateOtherwiseInt(Q)|| |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
TranslateGenCons(genexact(C),P,cons(Cons),Q)
|| service->M
ifzero(M)
service<-1
ifc->L1
ne(L1,nil)
Nl Put("cServiceInvoke = initially null then if {")
Nl explorestackif
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(")")
Put(" -> if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(" \"true\" ->")
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Nl Put("}")
Nl PrintAllServicesFromRest(P)
Nl (|ContainsServices(Q)
Put("otherwise ->")
TranslateOtherwiseInt(Q) || |)
Put("}")
CloseBrackets
Put(";")
TranslateGenCons(genexact(C),P,cons(Cons),Q)
|| TranslateGenCons(genexact(C),P,cons(Cons),Q) |)
'rule' TranslateIntIf(if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q),P1,cons(Cons1),Q1):
ifc->L
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PushConstraintIf(cons(Cons1),L)
TranslateProcessIf(P,Q,cons(Cons))

/*----------------------TRANSLATE OTHERWISE INT----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateOtherwiseInt(P: PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseInt(parproc(P,Q))
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseInt(dotext(E,P)):
TranslateOtherwiseInt(P)
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseInt(dotint(C,P)):
TranslateOtherwiseIntRest(C,P)
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseInt(zero)

/*---------------------TRANSLATE OTHERWISE INT REST------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateOtherwiseIntRest(C: INT_COMP, P:PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseIntRest(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genincomp(C)),P):
Nl Put(" if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Put("}")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
Nl Put("};")
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseIntRest(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genexact(C)),P):
Nl Put(" if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
atCvarlist(varlist(V,L))
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L))
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put(" + ")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Put("}")
Nl Put("};")
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseIntRest(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genincomp(C)),P):
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(" \"true\" ->")
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
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Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("")
Put("}")
Nl PrintRestServiceCalls(C,P)
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseIntRest(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genexact(C)),P):
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(" \"true\" ->")
id_to_string(I->I1)
id_to_string(J->J1)
Put("\"")
Put(I1)
Put(":")
Put(J1)
Put("(\"")
Put("+")
Put("\"")
Put(X1)
Put("\"")
Put("+")
Put("\")\"")
Put("") Put("}") PrintAllServicesFromRest(P) Put("};") Nl
'rule' TranslateOtherwiseIntRest(if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q),P1):
Put("if{")
Nl Put("[]")
Put("@T(")
Printcons(Cons)
Put(" )->")
TranslateOtherwiseInt(P)
Nl Put("otherwise ->")
Nl TranslateOtherwiseInt(Q)
Nl Put("};")

/*-----------------------TRANSLATE GENERAL CONSTRAINTS---------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateGenCons(C:GEN_ACT,P:PROCESS,B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP,Q:PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateGenCons(genexact(C),P,cons(Cons),Q):
TranslateExtIf(C,P,cons(Cons),Q)
TranslateProcessIf(P,Q,cons(Cons))
'rule' TranslateGenCons(genincomp(C),P,cons(Cons),Q):
TranslateIntIf(C,P,cons(Cons),Q)
'rule' TranslateGenCons(dotgenact(C,D),P,cons(Cons),Q):
TranslateGenCons(C,P,cons(Cons),Q)
TranslateGenCons(D,P,cons(Cons),Q)

/*--------------------TRANSLATE GENERAL CONSTRAINTS OTHERWISE---------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateGenConsOth(C:GEN_ACT,P:PROCESS,B:BOOLEAN_INT_COMP,Q:PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateGenConsOth(genexact(C),P,cons(Cons),Q):
TranslateExtOtherwiseModule(C,Q,cons(Cons))
TranslateProcessIf(P,Q,cons(Cons))
'rule' TranslateGenConsOth(genincomp(C),P,cons(Cons),Q):
TranslateIntIf(C,P,cons(Cons),Q)
'rule' TranslateGenConsOth(dotgenact(C,D),P,cons(Cons),Q):
TranslateGenConsOth(C,P,cons(Cons),Q)
TranslateGenConsOth(D,P,cons(Cons),Q)
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/*-----------------------TRANSLATE GENERAL ACTIONS---------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' TranslateGen(C:GEN_ACT,P:PROCESS)
'rule' TranslateGen(genexact(C),P):
TranslateExt(C,P)
TranslateProcess(P)
'rule' TranslateGen(genincomp(C),P):
TranslateInt(C,P)
'rule' TranslateGen(dotgenact(C,D),P):
TranslateGen(C,P)
TranslateGen(D,P)

/*------------------------PRINTING CONSTRAINTS--------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' Printcons(Cons: CONSTRAINT)
'rule' Printcons(gtc(U,V)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put(">")
Printnumber(V)
'rule' Printcons(ltc(U,V)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put("<")
Printnumber(V)
'rule' Printcons(geq(U,V)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put(">=")
Printnumber(V)
'rule' Printcons(leq(U,V)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put("<=")
Printnumber(V)
'rule' Printcons(eqeqcons(U,V)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put("==")
Printnumber(V)
'rule' Printcons(gtcv(U,V)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put(">")
PrintUntypedVariable(V)
'rule' Printcons(ltcv(U,V)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put("<")
PrintUntypedVariable(V)
'rule' Printcons(geqv(U,V)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put(">=")
PrintUntypedVariable(V)
'rule' Printcons(leqv(U,V)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put("<=")
PrintUntypedVariable(V)
'rule' Printcons(eqeq(U,V)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put("==")
PrintUntypedVariable(V)
'rule' Printcons(ltcvc(U,V,C)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put("<")
PrintUntypedVariable(V)
Put("+")
Printnumber(C)
'rule' Printcons(leqvc(U,V,C)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put("<=")
PrintUntypedVariable(V)
Put("+")
Printnumber(C)
'rule' Printcons(geqvc(U,V,C)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put(">=")
PrintUntypedVariable(V)
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Put("+")
Printnumber(C)
'rule' Printcons(eqeqc(U,V,C)):
PrintUntypedVariable(U)
Put("==")
PrintUntypedVariable(V)
Put("+")
Printnumber(C)
'rule' Printcons(and(U,V)):
Printcons(U)
Put("&&")
Printcons(V)

/*-----------------------PRINTING NUMBERS--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' Printnumber(C: INT)
'rule' Printnumber(C):
PutI(C)

/*-----------------------PRINT UNTYPED VARIABLE--------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintUntypedVariable(U: UNTYPED_VAR)
'rule' PrintUntypedVariable(untyped_var(U)):
id_to_string(U->U1)
Put(U1)
'rule' PrintUntypedVariable(untyped_string(U)):
id_to_string(U->U1)
Put("\"")
Put(U1)
Put("\"")
'rule' PrintUntypedVariable(empty_string):
Put("\"")
Put("\"")

/*-----------------------PRINTING VARIABLE LIST--------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintVarlist(L:VARLIST)
'rule' PrintVarlist(varlist(V,L)):
PrintvariableNoType(V)
Put(" + ")
Put("\",\"")
(|ne(L,nil)
Put(" + ")
PrintVarlist(L)
|| PrintVarlist(L)|)
'rule' PrintVarlist(nil):
Put("+")

/*-----------------------PRINTING VARIABLE-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' Printvariable(V: VAR)
'rule' Printvariable(var(type(T),X)):
id_to_string(T->T0)
Put(T0)
Put(" ")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(X1)

/*----------------PRINT VARIABLE WITH NO TYPE----------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintvariableNoType(V: VAR)
'rule' PrintvariableNoType(var(type(T),X)):
Put(" ")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(X1)
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/*-----------------------PRINTING CHANNEL--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
'action' PrintChannel(C: CHANNEL)
'rule' PrintChannel(channel(var(type(T),X))):
Nl id_to_string(T->T0)
Put(T0)
Put(" ")
id_to_string(X->X1)
Put(X1)
Put(";") Nl
/*---------------------------CONDITIONS--------------------------------------------------------------------------*/

'condition' IsStack(I:INT)
'rule' IsStack(I):
stack->J
eq(I,J)

'condition' ifzero(I:INT)
'rule' ifzero(I):
eq(I,0)

'condition' checkdeclaredvariable(C:CHANNEL)
'rule' checkdeclaredvariable(channel(var(T,X))):
declaredvariable -> L
eq(L,nil)
'rule' checkdeclaredvariable(channel(var(T,X))):
declaredvariable->chanlist(U,V)
notchannelsearch(channel(var(T,X)),U)
notchannelsearchlist(channel(var(T,X)),V)

'condition' ChecknotVar(V:CHANNEL)
'rule' ChecknotVar(channel(var(T,X))):
checkl->L
eq(L,nil)
'rule' ChecknotVar(channel(var(T,X))):
checkl->lst(U,V)
notsearch(var(T,X),U)
notsearchlist(var(T,X),V)

'condition' notsearch(V:VAR, U:VARPAIR)
'rule' notsearch(var(T,X),varpair(channel(var(T1,X1)),N)):
(| ne(T,T1)
|| ne(X,X1)|)

'condition' notchannelsearch(C:CHANNEL, U:CHANNEL)
'rule' notchannelsearch(channel(var(T,X)),channel(var(T1,X1))):
(| ne(T,T1)
|| ne(X,X1)|)

'condition' notsearchlist(V:VAR, C:CHECKLIST)
'rule' notsearchlist(var(T,X),nil)
'rule' notsearchlist(var(T,X),lst(varpair(U,N), W)):
notsearch(var(T,X),varpair(U,N))
notsearchlist(var(T,X),W)

'condition' notchannelsearchlist(C:CHANNEL, D:CHANLIST)
'rule' notchannelsearchlist(channel(var(T,X)),nil)
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'rule' notchannelsearchlist(channel(var(T,X)),chanlist(C, W)):
notchannelsearch(channel(var(T,X)),C)
notchannelsearchlist(channel(var(T,X)),W)

'condition' ContainsServices(P: PROCESS)
'rule' ContainsServices(dotext(E,P)):
ContainsServices(P)
'rule' ContainsServices(dotint(C,P)):
(|ContainsServicesInt(C,P)|| ContainsServices(P)|)

'condition' ContainsServicesInt(C: INT_COMP, P:PROCESS)
'rule' ContainsServicesInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genincomp(C)),P)
'rule' ContainsServicesInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genexact(C)),P)
'rule' ContainsServicesInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genincomp(C)),P)
'rule' ContainsServicesInt(let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genexact(C)),P)
'rule' ContainsServicesInt(if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q),P1):
(| ContainsServices(P)
|| ContainsServices(Q)|)

'condition' ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V:VAR,P: PROCESS)
'rule' ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V,dotext(E,P)):
(|ContainsDefinitionExt(V,E) ||
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V,P)|)
'rule' ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V,dotint(C,P)):
ContainsDefinitionInt(V,C,P)

'condition' ContainsDefinitionExt(V:VAR,E: EXT_ACT)
'rule' ContainsDefinitionExt(var(T,X),comm(bracket(C,var(T1,X1)))):
eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
'rule' ContainsDefinitionExt(var(T,X),comm(angle(channel(var(T1,X1)),V))):
eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
'rule' ContainsDefinitionExt(var(T,X),comm(send(channel(var(T1,X1)),U))):
eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)
'rule' ContainsDefinitionExt(var(T,X),comm(send1(channel(var(T1,X1)),U))):
eq(T,T1)
eq(X,X1)

'condition' ContainsDefinitionInt(V: VAR, C: INT_COMP, P:PROCESS)
'rule' ContainsDefinitionInt(V1,let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genincomp(C)),P):
(| ContainsDefinitionInt(V1,C,P)
|| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V1,P)|)
'rule' ContainsDefinitionInt(V1,let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,varlist(V,L)),genexact(C)),P):
(| ContainsDefinitionExt(V1,C)
|| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V1,P)|)
'rule' ContainsDefinitionInt(V1,let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genincomp(C)),P):
ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V1,P)
'rule' ContainsDefinitionInt(V1,let_instantiate(var(type(T),X),method(T1,I,J,nil),genexact(C)),P):
(| ContainsDefinitionExt(V1,C)
|| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V1,P)|)
'rule' ContainsDefinitionInt(V1,if_then_else(cons(Cons),P,Q),P1):
(| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V1,P)
|| ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V1,Q)|)

'condition' ContainsPrintableType(V: VARLIST)
'rule' ContainsPrintableType(varlist(var(type(T),X),L)):
(| id_to_string(T->T1)
ne(T1,"aldef")
|| ContainsPrintableType(L) |)

'condition' ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh(C:CHANNEL,Q: PROCESS)
'rule' ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinitionCh(channel(V),Q):
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ContainsOtherInstancesOfDefinition(V,Q)

'action' id_to_string(IDENT->STRING)

'type' PRN
module
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